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ECONOMISTS  CONTINUE  to  be baffled by the mystery of inflationary re- 
cession  (or stagflation)  that has been experienced  by industrialized  coun- 
tries  during  the 1970s.  What  causes  inflation  to churn  on and on even  after 
excess  demand  disappears?  This whodunit  is the latest  in a long series  that 
reflects  the inadequacy  of current  theory  in explaining  the mechanics  of 
how inflation  proceeds  once it has begun.  In this paper,  I shall sketch  an 
interpretation  of the persistence  of inflation  based on an interaction  of 
"customer"  or "career"  markets,  in which  prices  and wages  do not equate 
supply  and demand,  with "auction"  markets,  in which  prices  do reliably 
clear  markets. 
Changing  Styles  in Inflation  Theory 
The suggested  interpretation  developed  in this paper builds on past 
theoretical  literature,  which  I shall briefly  review  as a foundation  for the 
subsequent  analysis. 
VINTAGE KEYNESIANISM 
Vintage  Keynesianism  of the  World  War  II period  offered  a comparative- 
static  view of price-level  equilibrium,  given an "inflationary  gap" and a 
Note: I am indebted to Nancy Delaney for her assistance  in the research,  and to 
Edward Gramlich and several participants  in the Brookings panel for constructive 
criticism. 
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dynamic  view of the approach  to that equilibrium.'  Over  a wide range  of 
output  from  very  depressed  levels  up to full employment,  variations  in ag- 
gregate  demand  changed  output  with  prices  and  wages  essentially  constant. 
On the other  hand,  in the inflationary  zone above  full employment,  incre- 
mental  aggregate  demand  merely  bid up the price  level,  leaving  production 
unchanged.  Thus,  the aggregate  supply  curve  relating  prices  and  output  had 
a right  angle.  And the task of optimum  policy  was to make  aggregate  de- 
mand  intersect  supply  at the vertex  of the right  angle-an assignment  that 
could  be difficult  but that  involved  no agonizing  tradeoff  or cruel  dilemma. 
Given  an inflationary  gap,  equilibrium  might  be restored  at a new  higher 
price level because  of a nonaccommodating  monetary  policy, or the re- 
duced  real  value  of cash  and government  bonds  (the  Pigou  effect),  or auto- 
matic  stabilizers  in the fiscal  system.  If, however,  these  equilibrating  forces 
were  nonexistent  or very weak,  hyperinflation  might  result. 
The  dynamic  determinacy  of the  price  level  was  attributed  to one or both 
of two'  basic  lags-(1) spending  behind  income  and  (2) wages  behind  prices. 
In the former,  consumers  and businessmen  formulated  dollar  budgets  for 
the  period  ahead,  and  stuck  to them;  thus,  a sufficientjump  in the  price  level 
would curb the real volume of spending  to the level of full-employment 
output.2  The rate  of inflation  then depended  on the size of the inflationary 
gap and the length  of the budgeting  lag. In the latter,  this period's  wage 
level  was set equal  to last period's  marginal  revenue  product  of labor;  real 
wages  thus  would  be squeezed  by inflation  and so would  real  consumer  ex- 
penditures  (even  if they did not lag behind  income). 
Much  later,  Robert  Clower  interpreted  these  lags as imperfections  in the 
process  of market  recontracting.  In the case of the budgeting  lag, develop- 
ments  in today's  factor  markets  do not get into today's  prices  on product 
markets.  In the case of the wage lag, today's developments  in product 
markets  cannot  get into today's  prices  on factor  markets.3  These  lags  pro- 
1. John Maynard  Keynes,  How to Pay  for the War  (Harcourt,  Brace, 1940).  See also, 
for example,  Carl  Shoup,  Milton  Friedman,  and Ruth P. Mack, Taxing  to Prevent Infla- 
tion (Columbia  University  Press, 1943); Ralph Turvey, "Some Aspects of the Theory 
of Inflation in a Closed Economy," Econonmic  Journal,  vol. 61 (September  1951), pp. 
531-43; and the references  in note 4 below. 
2. That would not happen,  however,  if the private  decisionmakers  formulated  their 
spending  plans as shopping  lists rather  than dollar  budgets. 
3. Robert  Clower,  "The Keynesian  Counterrevolution:  A Theoretical  Appraisal,"  in 
F. H. Hahn and F. P. R. Brechling,  eds., The Theory  of Interest  Rates (St. Martin's, 
1965),  pp. 112-13, 121-24.  The same  kind  of mechanism  underlies  the model in Robert  J. 
Barro and Herschel I. Grossman, "A General Disequilibrium  Model of Income and 
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duce interesting  difference-equation  models of the inflationary  process.4 
Yet they  have  not been  a fruitful  basis  for quantification.  The  lengths  of the 
lags were  never  estimated  with any precision;  and no link was established 
between  the  rate  of inflation  and  the size  of the  inflationary  gap.  Indeed,  the 
very  existence  of a budgeting  lag was never  empirically  demonstrated.  And 
while  wages  and prices  demonstrably  chased  each other,  the evidence  did 
not establish  that real wages were depressed  by inflation  as the vintage 
Keynesian  wage  lag insisted.5 
Gradually,  in response  to postwar  experience,  economists  rounded  the 
right  angle  of the aggregate  supply  curve,  converted  full employment  into 
a zone, and developed  the concept  of a tradeoff.  But the early  fifties  gave 
them  no reason  to puzzle  over  the momentum  of rising  prices  because  infla- 
tion screeched  to a halt in 1951-a  development  that still stands  out in 
retrospect  as an intriguing  fortuitous  mystery.  The  events  of 1956-57  posed 
another,  unpleasant,  mystery:  why  inflation  began  so soon at aggregate  un- 
employment  and operating  rates  that apparently  did not involve  generally 
excessive  demand.  Charles  Schultze  analyzed  that  puzzle  with  a refined  ver- 
sion of the vintage  Keynesian  inflation  model,  stressing  sectoral  imbalances 
in demand  and  asymmetric  responses  to excess  supply  and  excess  demand.6 
PHILLIPS  APPROACH 
The Phillips approach  departed  fundamentally  from vintage Keynes- 
ianism  by relating  a given  utilization  rate  to a given  rate of inflation  rather 
than an equilibrium  level of prices,  thus positing  a continuous  tradeoff  be- 
tween  inflation  and unemployment.  As James  Tobin put it, "The  Phillips 
curve  has  been  an empirical  finding  in search  of a theory. . ."I  Tobin's  own 
4. For example, see Tjalling Koopmans, "The Dynamics of Inflation,"  Review of 
Econzomic  Statistics,  vol. 24 (May 1942),  pp. 53-65; A. Smithies,  "The  Behavior  of Money 
National  Income  under  Inflationary  Conditions,"  Quarterly  Journial  of Economics,  vol. 57 
(November 1942), pp. 113-28; and Ralph Turvey, "Period Analysis and Inflation," 
Economica,  n.s., vol. 16 (August 1949), pp. 218-27. 
5. The frustrations  of one young  economist  with these hypotheses  (and his unproduc- 
tive negative  conclusions)  are  evident  in ArthuLr  M. Okun,  "The  Effects  of Open  Inflation 
on Aggregate  Consumer  Demand" (Ph.D. dissertation,  Columbia  University,  1956). 
6.  Charles L.  Schultze,  Recent In2flation2  in the  United States,  Study  Paper No.  l  of 
materials  prepared  in connection with the Study of Employment,  Growth, and Price 
Levels for consideration  by the Joint Economic Committee, 86 Cong. 1 sess. (1959), 
pp. 44-77. 
7. James  Tobin, "Inflation  and Unemployment,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 62 
(March  1972),  p. 9. 354  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1975 
rationale rested on a model of  "stochastic macro-equilibrium" in which 
disequilibria  in particular  markets could maintain some stable positive in- 
flation rate in the presence of some persistent degree of overall labor-market 
tightness. 
Asymmetries and nonlinearities could account for the puzzle of 1960-63 
-a  continuing rate of inflation of 1 or 2 percent in an excess-supply econ- 
omy. If some prices and most wages are rigid on the down side and if the 
response of wages to unemployment is nonlinear, then excess demand in a 
minority of sectors can produce some upcreep in overall price levels. 
Empirically,  the Phillips curve looked like a winner for the United States. 
Annual increases in prices (and wages) relative to  unemployment rates 
for 1954 to 1968 fit a hyperbola like a glove.8 A few refinements  took care 
of the minor deviations. The persistence of the 1956-57 inflation into 1958 
could be explained by some short lags of a vintage Keynesian type; the 
somewhat better tradeoff performance of the early sixties relative to the 
fifties could be accounted for by the price-wage guideposts or by "hidden 
unemployment."9 
The stubbornness of wage and price inflation in 1970-71 ended the hey- 
day of the Phillips approach. Perry  sought to save the Phillips curve by rein- 
terpreting the measure of  labor-market tightness to  reflect the  shifting 
demographic composition of unemployment.10  The Perry shift is now gen- 
erally accepted as a constructive refinement, but it explains only a small 
part of the "new" inflation of the 1970s. The expansion of unemployment 
insurance and welfare benefits was also invoked to account for tighter labor 
markets at a given unemployment rate. 
The other major analytical developments stressed expectations. Accord- 
ing to one thesis, the economy became more inflation prone because private 
decisionmakers perceived increased tolerance for inflation and reduced 
tolerance for unemployment on the part of government. I would not dis- 
8. These gave no reason to suspect  that the structure  had changed  through 1968. In 
terms  of the relationship  between  prices  and the official  unemployment  rate,  the observa- 
tions for 1966-68 showed, if anything,  a slightly  more favorable  tradeoff  than those of 
1956-57.  See the chart in the Economic Report of the President together with the Annual 
Report of the Council of Economic Advisers, January 1969, p. 95. 
9. George  L. Perry,  "Wages  and the Guideposts,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 57 
(September  1967),  pp. 897-904; N. J. Simler  and Alfred  Tella, "Labor  Reserves  and the 
Phillips Curve," Review of Economics and Statistics,  vol.  50 (February 1968), pp. 32-49. 
10. George L. Perry,  "Changing  Labor Markets  and Inflation,"  BPEA, 3:1970, pp. 
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miss this hypothesis." But I doubt that it explains much. For one thing, the 
hypothesis would predict stronger spending behavior-a  movement along 
the Phillips curve, as well as a shift in it. If consumers and firms detect an 
expansionary  bias in stabilization policy, aggregate private demand should 
be stronger for given settings of fiscal and monetary policies; I see no evi- 
dence that this has been the case. 
ACCELERATIONISM 
Accelerationismwasthe most fundamental  transformation of the Phillips 
approach into an expectational format. It hypothesized that inflation will 
become increasingly  rapid in any maintained situation in which unemploy- 
ment lies below some critical, or "natural," rate. Basically, it argued that 
the very possibility of getting unemployment below the natural rate de- 
pends on a process of fooling people-coaxing  out higher employment and 
higher production with higher prices for the things they sell and then sur- 
prising them with higher prices than they expected on the things they buy. 
Through lags in the perception of inflation, these surprises  raise output and 
employment, but as people learn that they are being fooled, the lags shorten. 
When Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps independently set forth 
this theory, the Phillips-curve approach seemed to be working very well. 
Basically, accelerationism  was a pessimistic forecast rather  than an explana- 
tion of experience; whatever else one thinks of the theory, the prophetic 
accuracy of its pessimism has to be admired.12  Some of the macroeconomic 
empirical facts of the early seventies fit the accelerationist theory. Even 
though the unemployment rate exceeded the natural rate (by anybody's 
estimate) in 1970-71, people were, according to the accelerationists, still 
adapting to the inflationary surprises of 1965-69; hence, inflation deceler- 
ated very slowly and only after a lag. 
11. See Arthur M. Okun, "The Mirage of Steady Inflation,"  BPEA, 2:1971, pp. 
485-98, and other  contributions  to that symposium:  William  Fellner,  "Phillips-type  Ap- 
proach  or Acceleration?"  pp. 469-83; and Robert  J. Gordon,  "Steady  Anticipated  Infla- 
tion: Mirage  or Oasis?"  pp. 499-510. 
12. Milton Friedman,  "The Role of Monetary  Policy,"  American  Econiomic  Review, 
vol. 58 (March  1968),  pp. 7-11, and Edmund  S. Phelps,  "Phillips  Curves,  Expectations  of 
Inflation and Optimal Unemployment  Over Time," Economica,  n.s., vol. 34 (August 
1967),  pp. 254-81. Actually,  the essential  elements  of the theory  were spelled out much 
earlier  in William  Fellner,  "Demand Inflation,  Cost Inflation,  and Collective  Bargain- 
ing," in Philip  D. Bradley,  ed., The  Puiblic  Stake in Union  Power  (University  of Virginia 
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More generally, the unemployment-inflation experience of the first half 
of the 1970s manifestly reveals a far less favorable tradeoff than does that 
of 1954-68. Clearly, the short-term Phillips curve has shifted upward. In 
the sense of recognizing that shift, we are all accelerationists now (to re- 
verse Friedman's celebrated concession to Keynes). On the other hand, I 
believe the inflation-unemployment  tradeoff applies to all relevant inflation 
and unemployment rates and all relevant time horizons. I find particularly 
incredible the clear (though often ignored) implication of the no-tradeoff 
view that inflation no longer imposes a cost. If the American public has 
fully adapted to some anticipated inflation rate like 6 percent, then that in- 
flation cannot do any good in expanding output and employment, but by 
the same token it cannot do any harm in distorting distribution or alloca- 
tion. The same public that allegedly adapted to that expected inflation rate 
still believes that inflation is painful; and so do I. 
The microanalytical underpinning of accelerationism is seriously defi- 
cient. In part, inflation is supposed to distort temporarily the tradeoff be- 
tween work and leisure. According to this story, when people observe a rise 
in money wages, they believe that real wages are rising too. Consequently 
they take jobs and give up leisure, which they now view as more expensive. 
Ultimately, however, they find that the cost of living has accelerated too, 
and the labor supply hence gradually shifts back. But why should people 
take significantly  longer to perceive the movement of the cost of living than 
that of wages? Even more fundamentally, how can the thesis assume a 
substantial positive elasticity of the supply of labor with respect to the real 
wage? While that proposition has been widely accepted (by Keynes, among 
others), the empirical evidence suggests that the elasticity is close to zero 
and may not even be positive.13 
In part, the temporary distortion is supposed to involve the tradeoff be- 
tween work and search (rather than leisure).14  According to this variant, 
13. See Robert J. Gordon, "The Welfare  Cost of Higher Unemployment,"  BPEA, 
1:1973,  table 2, p. 159, and George F. Break,  "The Incidence  and Economic  Effects  of 
Taxation,"  in Alan S. Blinder  and others, The Economics  of Public  Finlance  (Brookings 
Institution,  1974),  pp. 180-91. Some demographic  groups  exhibit  a positive  response  to 
their own wage, but offsetting  that are the negative  cross-elasticities  of the labor sup- 
plied by one family member  to the wage of other members. 
14. Models of  work-leisure-search  distortions include Dale T.  Mortensen, "Job 
Search,  the Duration of Unemployment,  and the Phillips  Curve,"  American  Econlomic 
Review, vol.  60 (December 1970), pp.  847-62; Edmund S.  Phelps, "Money-Wage 
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because  the unemployed  do not know the universe  of job offers,  they in- 
terpret  a good offer  in an improving  labor  market  as a high  relative wage 
and  take  it rather  than  continuing  their  search.  Thus,  the average  duration 
of unemployment  and hence  the number  of unemployed  decline.  But ulti- 
mately  job seekers  recognize  that  it is worthwhile  to take  more  time  to sort 
the favorable  offers  of a strong  labor  market.  As a result,  the drop  in unem- 
ployment  must  be temporary,  lasting  only so long as people  are fooled. 
The facts of the real world  do not square  with the implications  of this 
work-search  hypothesis.  First,  as Perry  has shown,  changes  in the number 
of spells  as well as in the duration  of unemployment  account  importantly 
for cyclical  fluctuations  in unemployment.  Second,  as Tobin  has noted,  the 
quit  rate  does  not lag  in an improving  labor  market.  Third,  rejections  of  job 
offers  are  less frequent  than  this theory  would  imply-except in the trivial 
sense that every  unemployed  person  has rejected  an "offer"  to become  a 
self-employed  garbage  picker.'5 
Some  accelerationist  models  are  rooted  in product  rather  than  labor  mar- 
kets.  In their  world,  output  exceeds  its equilibrium  level temporarily  when 
expected  selling  prices  are especially  high in relation  to expected  buying 
prices.'6  I know  of no empirical  evidence  of such  cyclically  systematic  errors 
in firms'  predictions  of selling  prices  relative  to buying  prices. 
Although  their  explanations  are  unsatisfactory,  I believe  that the search 
of the "search  theorists"  has not been  in vain.  They  have  correctly  focused 
attention  on the way  wages  and  employment  must  adjust  through  a search 
process  in the absence  of a market-clearing  mechanism  that would  adjust 
wages  to keep  supply  and demand  in equilibrium. 
The  effort  to build  the analytical  base  for accelerationism,  led by Phelps, 
has produced  constructive  research  into the "microeconomic  foundations" 
of both  employment  and  inflation  theory.  The  pervasive  issue  is the  relative 
role of quantity  adjustments  and of price  (wage)  adjustments  in different 
types  of markets  over  different  time  horizons;  this  tied  back  into the earlier 
efforts  by Hicks,  Tobin,  Patinkin,  and Leijonhufvud  to make  sense  of the 
(July/August, 1968), pt. 2, pp. 678-711; and Robert E. Lucas, Jr., and Leonard A. 
Rapping,  "Real Wages,  Employment,  and Inflation,"  in Edmund  S. Phelps and others, 
Microeconomic  Foundations  of Employment  anid  Inflation  Theory  (Norton, 1970). 
15. George L. Perry, "Unemployment  Flows in the U.S. Labor Market,"  BPEA, 
2:1972, pp. 263-75; Tobin, "Inflation  and Unemployment,"  p. 7; Gordon, "Welfare 
Cost of Higher  Unemployment." 
16. See Thomas  J. Sargent,  "Rational  Expectations,  the Real Rate of Interest,  and the 
Natural  Rate of Unemployment,"  BPEA, 2:1973, pp. 429-72, especially  p. 435. 358  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1975 
Keynesian  theory  of involuntary  unemployment.'7  And the common  theme 
is that, in markets  that lack a clearing  mechanism,  quantities  vary a lot 
because  prices  (wages)  vary  too little  and too late. These  nonclearing  phe- 
nomena  are the heart  of the explanation  of both inflationary  and reces- 
sionary  processes. 
PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER 
I shall  now sketch  a nonclearing  argument  that  makes  sense  to me, draw- 
ing on various  strands  of the literature.  Because  of the absence  of market- 
clearing  mechanisms,  quantity  adjustments  carry the burden for many 
types  of product  and factor  markets,  leading  to the observed  sluggishness 
and persistence  of inflation  and of excessive  unemployment.  While  many 
elements  (including  some  monopoly  models,  transactions  costs, uncertain- 
ties, and various  sunk  costs)  can explain  the absence  of market  clearing,  I 
shall stress  the cost of information,  interpreting  it broadly  (too broadly, 
some  may  feel)  to include  costs  of prediction,  of establishing  reliability,  and 
the like.'8 
In particular,  the  costs  of information  lead  to implicitly  contractual  long- 
term relationships  between  employees  and employers  and between  cus- 
tomers  and  suppliers.  These  relationships  create  a zone  of indeterminacy  for 
wages  and  prices  and  a need  for "fair"  formulas  for  the sharing  of bilateral 
monopoly  surpluses.  By putting  price  and  wage  making  into a longer-term 
context,  they  lengthen  the lags and  weaken  the causal  connections  between 
changes  in demand  and changes  in prices  or wages. 
I shall  then explore  some implications  of the resulting  lags in the infla- 
tionary  process.  Prices  and wages  in "customer  markets"  will lag behind 
17. John Hicks, Capital  and  Growth  (Oxford  University  Press, 1965),  pp. 74-77; J. R. 
Hicks, Value  anzd  Capital  (2d ed., London: Oxford  University  Press, 1946),  pp. 245-72; 
James  Tobin, "Money Wage Rates and Employment,"  in Seymour  E. Harris,  ed., Thle 
New Economics  (Knopf, 1947); Don Patinkin, Money, Interest, and Prices (2d ed., 
Harper  and Row, 1965),  pp. 313-34; Axel Leijonhufvud,  On Keynesian  Economics  anld 
the Economics  of Keynes:  A Study  in Monetary  Theory  (Oxford  University  Press, 1968), 
pp. 102-09. 
18. I believe  my semantics  are  in the spirit  of Kenneth  J. Arrow,  "Limited  Knowledge 
and Economic  Analysis,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 64 (March 1974),  pp. 1-10. 
I do not mean that people are ignorant or generally uninformed;  I share Michael 
Wachter's  concern (expressed  in his comments below) that the terminology  may be 
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those in "auction  markets."  Thus,  inflation  must  affect  the allocation  of re- 
sources  and change  relative  prices.  Hence,  there  can be no uniform  "real" 
interest  rate whose constancy  might maintain  a simple equilibrium  of 
financial  markets  during  inflation. 
Customer  markets  depend  heavily  on-and  in turn  enhance-the useful- 
ness  of money  as a yardstick  and as a store  of value;  that usefulness  is im- 
paired  in a world  of inflation,  as are  many  aspects  of buyer-seller  relation- 
ships  that  are "efficient"  institutions  in a complex  world.  Thus,  the welfare 
costs usually  attributed  to inflation-haphazard  redistributions  of income 
and wealth and socially unproductive  economizing  of cash balances- 
should  be viewed  in a broader  context  as disturbances  to a set of institu- 
tions that economize  on information,  prediction,  and transaction  costs 
through  continuing  buyer-seller  relationships.  Inflation  does fool people, 
as the accelerationists  contend.  But it does so, not so much  by disappoint- 
ing their  point-estimate  expectations  as by depriving  them  of a way of eco- 
nomic life in which  they need not depend  heavily  on the formulation  of 
costly  and uncertain  point-estimate  expectations. 
The skeleton  I shall  sketch  below  has  many  missing  analytical  bones  and 
no empirical  flesh.  Yet I believe  this  basic  approach  has far-reaching  impli- 
cations  for both analysis  and  policy.  It reveals  weaknesses  in proposals  for 
living  with inflation  by indexation.  It explains  why most of the American 
public  dislikes  inflation  so much  more  intensely  than  does  most of the eco- 
nomics profession.  It offers  a common approach  for product  and labor 
markets,  encompassing  administered  prices  and sticky  wages.  It suggests 
that the welfare  costs of garden-variety,  nagging  inflation  are qualitatively 
similar  to (although  far  smaller  than)  the distortions  of allocation  typically 
attributed  to galloping,  acute hyperinflation.  It explicitly  recognizes  the 
store-of-value  function  of money  and  rescues  inflation  theory  from  "barter 
illusion."  This approach  advances  the line of thinking  of my 1973  article 
on upward  mobility,  but contrasts  with views I expressed  as recently  as 
1970 and with most discussions  of inflation  in the literature."9  The out- 
19. "Upward  Mobility  in a High-Pressure  Economy,"  BPEA, 1:1973,  pp. 235-52; and 
Arthur  M. Okun, "Inflation:  The Problems  and Prospects  Before Us," in Arthur M. 
Okun,  Henry  H. Fowler,  and Milton Gilbert,  Inflation:  The  Problems  It Creates  and the 
Policies It Requires  (New York University  Press, 1970), pp. 12-22. The best of the 
"standard"  treatments  is Robert M. Solow, "The Intelligent  Citizen's  Guide to Infla- 
tion,"  Public  Interest,  no. 38 (Winter  1975),  pp. 39-49. 360  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1975 
standing  exception  is John  Hicks,  whose  recent  analysis  of the welfare  costs 
of inflation  delivers  the same  principal  message  as does this paper.20 
Customer  Markets 
In traditional  short-run  market  analysis,  firms  are  viewed  as price  takers 
and quantity  makers.  In the Marshallian  case, the prototype  competitive 
firm  has a given  quantity  of fresh  fish or fresh  fruit  on hand  that it dumps 
onto an auction  market  to fetch  whatever  price  it will bring.2'  Manifestly, 
most sellers  of products  in the real world are quantity  takers  and price 
makers;  even those with minuscule  market  shares  put price  tags on their 
commodities.  In the short  run, they are never  surprised  by the price,  and 
always  subject  to surprise  about  the quantities  they sell. 
If price  making  meant  nothing  more  than  the  absence  of auction  markets, 
price  tags and price  lists would  introduce  only the tiniest  lag in the adjust- 
ment  of prices  and trivial  fluctuations  in quantities.  Any firm  (competitive 
or  monopolistic)  that  experienced  a surprising  rise  in demand  would  tend  to 
raise  its prices  promptly,  and  those  unfavorably  surprised  would  tend  to re- 
duce  them.  A few  other  considerations  might  lengthen  that  lag a bit: it costs 
something  and  takes  some  time  to make  and  implement  the  firm's  decisions 
on prices  and  then  to print  and  distribute  the new  price  lists. But  these  ele- 
ments imply an inertia  of prices  that should last for days or weeks, not 
years.  And they cannot explain  movements  in the wrong direction-like 
rising  prices  in the summer  of 1975. 
After  a shift  in demand,  competitive  producers  could,  in principle,  reach 
the new equilibrium  price  after  a few rounds  of price  changes  without  an 
auctioneer.  Suppose  there  are many, fairly  similar  small  hotels in a large 
city, and that the marginal  cost of having  an additional  room occupied  is 
negligible.  With no auction  (or organized  exchange)  mechanism  to keep 
occupancy  essentially  full  and  stable  by varying  the price,  a downward  shift 
in demand  might  produce  a short interval  of depressed  occupancy  rates; 
20. See the concluding  portion of The Crisis in Keynesian  Economics  (Basic Books, 
1974).  Specifically  (p. 79): "Any system  of prices  [and  wages]  ...  is bound  to work more 
easily  if it is allowed  to acquire,  to some  degree,  the sanction  of custom....  This, I believe, 
is the true  reason  why inflation  is damaging....  In conditions  of inflation  [arrangements] 
conltinually  need re-fixing,  so that issues  which  had seemed  closed have to be reopened." 
21. See Alfred  Marshall,  Principles  of Economics  (8th ed., London: Macmillan,  1947), 
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but the restoration  of equilibrium  would  not take very  long, if the hotels 
were  seriously  trying  to be do-it-yourself  auctioneers.  No recession  would 
ensue,  in which  the hotels accept  less occupancy  and maintain  their  room 
charges  while  expecting  occupancy  to continue  depressed.  Nor would  pro- 
longed  booms  emerge.22 
The absence  of the auctioneer  has more  important  effects.  First,  it con- 
fronts the potential customer  for the hotel room with a costly search 
process  (like that of the unemployed  worker).23  Even so, if the potential 
customer  sampled  a few hotels randomly  every time he contemplated  a 
purchase,  the lack  of an auctioneer  would  merely  reduce  the  price  elasticity 
of demand,  increasing  the effective  degree  of monopoly  within  the industry 
and  thus  the profit-maximizing  price.  The  real  reason  that  the auctioneer  is 
missed  so much  and that  hotels  do not try to be do-it-yourself  auctioneers 
is that the optimizing  innkeeper  will recognize  his ability  to influence  the 
search  behavior  of the customer.  Today's occupants  have indicated  that 
they regarded  the hotel's  offer  (at least ex ante)  as a satisfactory  deal. By 
pledging  continuity  of that  offer,  the innkeeper  can  encourage  customers  to 
return  to buy, or at least  to sample,  using  yesterday's  experience  as a guide 
to today's offerings.  A kind of intertemporal  comparison  shopping  de- 
velops  by which  yesterday's  offer  influences  today's  demand,  as a result  of 
an implied  commitment  of the seller  to maintain  his offer. 
The  customer  who  counts  on that  stability  believes  he knows  the  terms  of 
his previous  supplier's  offer  without  shopping.  But he must  shop to deter- 
nmine  the offers  (price,  quality,  service)  of unfamiliar  sellers.  It is as though 
that information  is recorded  on a card that can be purchased  for a non- 
trivial  price.  In such  a situation,  maximizing  behavior  for  the customer  may 
resemble  satisficing  behavior.  The  expected  value  of the  information  card  is 
low when  the status  quo is satisfactory.  Knowing  this,  the supplier  wants  to 
ensure  that  the customer  will  not find  it worthwhile  to buy  the information 
card.  He can assume  that, if today's  offer  is maintained,  most of today's 
customers  will return.  If he also believes  that any rise in his price  will in- 
22. Nor is it conceivable  that, despite  the shift in demand,  each hotel owner  believes 
that  the price  elasticity  of demand  at the prevailing  price,  and hence  the profit-maximizing 
price,  is unaffected. 
23. See the model presented  by Edmund  S. Phelps  and Sidney  G. Winter,  Jr., "Opti- 
mal Price Policy under  Atomistic Competition,"  in Phelps and others, Microeconomic 
Foundations.  I am introducing  one new element  that is not in their model: relating  the 
customer's  search  behavior  to the supplier's  pricing  strategy. 362  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1975 
crease  discretely  the proportion  of his customers  who will buy  information 
cards,  he will tend to leave  his price  unchanged,  even when  demand  rises. 
THE BUYER-SELLER RELATIONSHIP 
An established  customer-supplier  relationship  introduces  a bilateral  mo- 
nopoly surplus that can be split between  the cooperating  buyers and 
sellers.  In the short  run,  most  customers  would  pay  a slightly  higher  price  to 
their  suppliers  without  shopping,  and  most suppliers  would,  if they  had  to, 
sell  for  a shade  less  to their  customers.  This  interdependence  puts  a premium 
on maintaining  the relationship  and on limiting  conflict  over  the sharing  of 
the surplus  to methods  that will not impair  its total value. 
The  supplier  obviously  cannot  promise  the customer  that  he will  offer  the 
same  deal forevermore.  In particular,  he may have to raise  his price  if his 
costs rise.  But he can promise  to treat  the customer  "fairly"  on all the di- 
mensions  of their  transactions,  thus offering  the customer  an implicit  con- 
tract.  It remains  implicit  because  of the high  cost of spelling  out and  nego- 
tiating  the terms  of an explicit,  formal  contract.  The implicit  contract  may 
apply to a wide variety of unspecified  contingencies  extending  beyond 
changes  in costs.  When  the supplier  and  customer  agree  on certain  rules  or 
conventions  of fair  play,  each  offers  the other  an effective  incentive  to play 
by those rules  (and a credible  threat  against  the one who breaks  them).24 
These  implicit  contracts  serve  as efficient  substitutes  for the costly  institu- 
tions of formal  long-term  contracts  and organized  futures  markets.25 
Empirically,  the typical  standard  of fairness  involves  cost-oriented  pric- 
ing with a markup.  Apparently,  in most industries,  the criterion  is full 
rather  than  variable  costs.  But it is based  on some  standard  or normal  out- 
put  rather  than  actual  output;  thus  the customer  is not asked  to pay  for the 
higher  overhead  per  unit  and  the  lower  productivity  of recessions.  The  con- 
cept  is also apparently  historical  costs,  which  are  obviously  subject  to more 
precise  calculation  than are replacement  costs. The recurrence  of transac- 
24. For a discussion  focusing  on the labor  market  that considers  a variety  of informal 
methods  of dealing  with contingencies,  see Oliver  E. Williamson,  Michael  L. Wachter, 
and Jeffrey E. Harris, "Understanding  the Employment  Relation: The Analysis of 
Idiosyncratic  Exchange,"  Bell Journal  of Economics,  vol. 6 (Spring  1975),  pp. 250-78. 
25. For  the  problems associated with  futures markets, see  Arrow, "Limited 
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tions between  customers  and suppliers  makes  it possible  to base the terms 
of sale  on the  facts  of the  past  rather  than  forecasts  of the future.  Once  such 
cost-based  pricing  practices  become  established,  the firm  can often count 
on its competitors  to set prices  in a similar  fashion.2" 
It can  justify  cost-oriented  price  increases-a desire  evident  in the dedi- 
cated,  if fuzzy,  statements  that  firms  issue,  insisting  that  higher  costs  "force" 
them to raise prices.  No supplier  can tell his customers:  "As a result of 
stronger  demand,  I am now in a position  to capture  a larger  share  of the 
surplus  from our relationship."  This attitude  influences  price-making  be- 
havior  as well  as public-relations  releases.  In effect,  the supplier  firm  repre- 
sents itself to its customers  as a kind of procurement  agency operating 
under  a brokerage  arrangement.  The markup  onto costs becomes  a rea- 
sonable  way to set a "fair"  price  for the services  of the firm. 
More  generally,  the customer-strategy  entrepreneur  gears  prices  to costs 
because  his reliance  on customers  vastly complicates  any fine-tuning  of 
prices  to demand  for purposes  of profit  maximization.  The price  elasticity 
of demand  for his product  is relatively  low in the short  run  because  of his 
established  clientele  (and that of his competitors),  but much  greater  in the 
long run  because  information  diffuses.  Hence,  the  firm  presumably  "under- 
prices"  -or  sacrifices-for the near term if it maximizes  the discounted 
future  stream  of profits  (rather  than current-period  profits).  Thus, a price 
reduction  in response  to a temporary  weakening  of demand  would often 
impose  an even greater  sacrifice  of current  profits  in order  to promote  fu- 
ture  profits.  Moreover,  the crucial  long-run  price  elasticities  of demand  are 
subject  to high  degrees  of risk  or uncertainty,  or to estimation  only  through 
expensive  market  research  (that is, high information  costs). A risk-averse 
firm  may  be discouraged  thereby  from  changing  prices  because  it sees  high 
variance  in the outcome  (a'  la Brainard)  or because  it is led to "slant"  the 
probabilities  (a'  la Fellner).27  In addition,  risk-averse  investors  may  like the 
reduced  cyclical  volatility  of profits  that  results  because  firms  "underprice" 
least  in periods  of weak  demand  and  most (thus,  investing  most for future 
demand)  in particularly  good times. 
26. Phillip  Cagan,  The  Hydra-Headed  Monster:  The  Problem  of Inflation  in the United 
States (American  Enterprise  Institute, 1974),  pp. 21-34. 
27. William  Brainard,  "Uncertainty  and the Effectiveness  of Policy," American  Eco- 
nomic  Review,  vol. 57 (May 1967), pp. 411-25; William  Fellner,  Probability  and  Profit 
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THE SCOPE OF CUSTOMER RELATIONS 
Customer  relationships  have  some  importance  to any  firm  whose  demand 
curve  is higher  than  it would  be if the  firm  were  offering  its product  for sale 
for the first  time-with no clientele,  reputation,  or record  of performance. 
Those  relationships  should  be most important  for heterogeneous  products 
and least important  for homogeneous  ones, where  the price  is uncompli- 
cated  by a quality  dimension.  Nonetheless,  heterogeneity  has  many  aspects 
beyond  the  physical  characteristics  of the  product,  including  transportation 
arrangements,  credit  terms,  speed  and  reliability  of delivery.  Thus,  depart- 
ment stores  facilitate  the return  of merchandise  for full refund  by regular 
customers  with  charge  accounts.  Wholesalers  who have  established  the re- 
liability  of small  retailers  for trade  credit  offer  financing  arrangements  to 
keep  them  as customers.  Similarly,  while  customer  relationships  seem  less 
important  for professional  buyers  than for households,  even the former 
cannot  assess  the long-term  reliability  of a new supplier,  and hence  prefer 
continuing  relationships.  Thus,  in a weak  steel  market,  imported  steel  may 
be priced 10 percent or more below the physically  identical domestic 
product.  In a strong  market,  however,  the reliable  customer  of domestic 
firms  is assured  of supplies,  in amounts  geared  to his past purchases,  at 
prices  below  those of imports. 
Big-ticket  items that are bought infrequently  might appear  to be least 
subject  to the customer  strategy.  Yet, repair  services  on autos and appli- 
ances  are  used  to maintain  relationships;  and  firms  work  to establish  brand- 
name reliability,  in effect  counting  on reputation  (a flow of information 
from one consumer  to the next) to substitute  for repetition.  Finally, oli- 
gopolistic  market  structures  that make price  competition  self-destructive 
among  firms  may encourage  uniform  and sticky  "administered  prices"  ac- 
companied  by differentiation  of services.28 
28. It is thus understandable  that Gardiner  Means and John Blair have found and 
stressed  a correlation  between  industrial-concentration  ratios and the kinds of pricing 
patterns  that I attribute  to customer  markets.  See National Resources  Committee,  The 
Structure  of the American  Economy,  A Report Prepared  by the Industrial  Section under 
the Direction  of Gardiner  C. Means  (Government  Printing  Office,  1939),  pt. 1, pp. 138- 
45; Gardiner  C. Means, "Simultaneous  Inflation  and Unemployment:  A Challenge  to 
Theory  and Policy," Challenge,  vol. 18 (September/October  1975),  pp. 6-20; and John 
M. Blair,  "Market  Power and Inflation:  A Short-Run  Target  Return Model,"  Journal 
of Econiomic  Issues,  vol. 8 (June 1974),  pp. 453-78. I do not, however,  believe  that sticky 
cost-based  prices are unique to oligopoly or could be eliminated  by changing market 
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In summary,  the prototype  of pricing  in customer  markets  is a markup 
over  past  costs. But  cost changes  show  up with  a lag because  prices  will be 
altered  only  when  average  costs  have  changed  by some  threshold  amount  or 
only at specified  intervals.  As Cagan  summarizes  the result: "Empirical 
studies  have long found that short-run  shifts in demand  have small and 
often insignificant  effects  [on prices],  and that, instead,  costs play a domi- 
nant  role."29  This empirical  finding  of markup  rigidity  is inconsistent  with 
the  classical  theory  of price  determination,  in which  the strength  of demand 
should  alter  the ratio of prices  to costs. 
CYCLICAL PATTERNS 
By dampening  its cyclical  price  fluctuations,  the customer-strategy  firm 
will magnify  its cyclical  variations  in orders  and sales. When  the firm  en- 
counters  an unexpected  drop  in demand,  its inventories  of finished  goods 
may increase;  its utilization  of its work force and capital  may decline;  it 
may cut its workweek;  it may reduce  hiring  and begin  layoffs;  or it may 
speed up deliveries.  And these changes  in quantities  may not be accom- 
panied  by changes  in price,  for the reasons  spelled  out above. 
When demand  strengthens  after a slump,  the same options  are thrown 
into reverse.  The firm  presumably  optimizes  so that it is equally  costly to 
meet favorable  sales surprises  (including  successes  in attracting  new cus- 
tomers)  by dipping  into  inventories,  lengthening  its workweek,  and  drawing 
on its queue  of job applicants.  Under  typical  circumstances,  the customer- 
strategy  firm  is likely  to maintain  some  reserve  of capacity  in all  three  forms. 
The  firm  may  be in disequilibrium  throughout  and  yet make  all the adjust- 
ments in quantities.  The forces inducing  changes  in prices can be very 
weak.30 
29. Cagan, Hydra-Headed  Monister, p. 22; also see the detailed  review of empirical 
findings  by William  D. Nordhaus,  "Recent Developments  in Price  Dynamics,"  in Otto 
Eckstein, ed., The Econometrics of Price Determiniation, A Conference sponsored  by the 
Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System  and Social Science  Research  Center 
(Board  of Governors,  1972),  pp. 34-43. Moreover,  the analytical  discussion  of short-run 
pricing  by Nordhaus  on pp. 21-27 and 31-34 is particularly  perceptive.  Another  valuable 
discussion is presented  by Otto Eckstein, "A Theory of the Wage-Price  Process in 
Modern Industry,"  Review  of Economic  Studies, vol. 31 (October 1964), pp. 269-71, 
281-82. For an analysis  of the rationale  of fixed pricing  intervals,  see Stephen  A. Ross 
and Michael L. Wachter, "Pricing and Timing Decisions in Oligopoly Industries," 
Quarterly Joulrnal  of Ecoiionoics, vol. 89 (February  1975),  pp. 115-37. 
30. In Vie customer-strategy  model, cost decreases  are no less likely to be passed 
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Career  Labor Markets 
Customer-supplier  relationships  in product  markets  are paralleled  by 
long-term  employer-employee  attachments  in labor  markets;  in combina- 
tion, the two models  unify  the analysis  of quantity-adjusting  responses  to 
disequilibrium  in labor and product  markets. 
Actually,  the labor-market  side  of this  analysis  is better  known  and  more 
widely  accepted,  and since  I have previously  explored  it in some detail,  I 
shall  treat  it only briefly  here.3'  Many  employers  adopt  policies  to promote 
long-run  attachment  by workers.  They pursue  that strategy  because  the 
value  of an experienced  worker  exceeds  that of an inexperienced  one by a 
margin  greater  than  the corresponding  wage  differential.  Entering  workers 
impose costs on the firm of screening,  hiring, training,  and on-the-job 
learning;  yet they cannot be made to bear these costs fully through  a 
lowered  entering  wage. For one thing, many of these "investments"  are 
valuable  to the worker  only  insofar  as he remains  an employee  of that  firm; 
the nontenured  recruit  wili not pay for them.  Second,  the relevant  interest 
rate  to the  worker  is likely  to be far  higher  than  that  to the  firm.  Third,  even 
the "general"  training  that improves  the worker's  marketability  to other 
firms  cannot  be properly  appraised  by him, given  his information.  Finally, 
the firm  will wish to bolster  the entering  wage  in order  to ensure  a queue 
of willing  applicants  that it can sort and screen  when  it needs  to hire new 
workers. 
Thus, the firm really  makes  an investment  in a new worker,  spending 
more  to hire,  train,  and pay him than he is worth  in the short  run. But it 
must  then amortize  that investment  by paying  wages  below  marginal  reve- 
nue product  to workers  who become  experienced.  Nonetheless,  the firm 
wants  to maintain  wage  rates  for experienced  workers  above  those of their 
next-best  opportunity  in the labor  market  in order  to hold down  quit  rates 
and  protect  its investment.  It will also hold down quit  rates  by offering  its 
result  is consistent  with Tobin's  view of the empirical  evidence:  "This [inflationary]  bias 
cannot  be attributed  to product  pricing,  which apparently  passes on proportionately  the 
changes  in labor costs . ..  in both directions-down as well as up." See James  Tobin, 
"The Wage-Price  Mechanism:  Overview  of the Conference,"  in Eckstein, ed., Econ- 
ometrics  of Price Determination,  p. 10. 
31. Okun,  "Upward  Mobility,"  pp. 235-44; also, see Stephen  A. Ross and Michael  L. 
Wachter,  "Wage Determination,  Inflation, and the Industrial  Structure,"  American 
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experienced  workers  regular  pay  increases  and growing  seniority  privileges 
in the form of fringe benefits,  retirement  programs,  and provisions  for 
leave and vacation.  These arrangements  create  a bilateral  monopoly  sur- 
plus and a zone of indeterminacy  for the wage  for an experienced  worker. 
That wage  must exceed  his perceived  best alternative  and be less than his 
current  marginal  revenue  product.  Again, because  of information  costs 
(and  sunk  costs),  the elasticity  with  respect  to the wage  has a time  gradient 
-from  low in the short run to high in the long run. These relationships 
have pervasive  empirical  consequences-the negative  correlation  between 
wage  rates  and  quit  rates,  the  extremely  low quit  rate  of experienced  workers 
in high-paying  industries,  the countercyclical  changes  in the size of wage 
differentials,  cyclical  patterns  of upgrading  jobs, the low levels of unfilled 
vacancies  for career  jobs even in tight labor markets,  and the like. 
This  long-attachment,  or "career,"  job market  is analogous  in many  fea- 
tures  to the customer-product  market.  But the roles  played  by buyers  and 
sellers  present  a set of interesting  contrasts.  The price  (wage  rate)  is set by 
the buyer  in labor markets  (outside  of collective  bargaining),  but by the 
seller in product  markets.  The other party then engages in search  (or 
shopping).  A seller  in product  markets  and a buyer  in labor  markets  typi- 
cally make  similar  transactions  with many  people  on the other  side of the 
market,  and  they  must  be price  makers,  at least  in part,  to display  equitable 
treatment  of the people  with  whom  they  deal.  Wage  discrimination  among 
similar  employees  of the same  firm  or price  discrimination  among  its cus- 
tomers  would  destroy  long-term  relationships. 
CYCLICAL RESPONSES 
Career  job arrangements  desensitize  the wage  rate  to changes  in overall 
tightness  of the labor market.  First, because  experienced  workers  earn 
more  than their  next-best  opportunity  wage,  strengthening  the labor  mar- 
ket  will  increase  the quit  rate  only  slightly.  Second,  the normal  queue  of ap- 
plicants  allows the firm  to hire new workers  without  raising  the entering 
wage.  To be sure,  the "marginal  effective  wage"  of the firm  may  increase.32 
A higher  rate of inflow  of new workers  may push  up marginal  hiring  and 
training  costs and force  the firm  to hire new workers  with poorer  creden- 
tials. Hence,  it may be worthwhile  to lengthen  the workweek,  even at the 
32. Robert E. Hall, "The Process of Inflation  in the Labor Market,"  BPEA, 2:1974, 
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cost of paying  overtime  premiums.  But the firm  has a strong  incentive  to 
avoid  an unscheduled  increase  in the entering  wage  insofar  as it would  feel 
obliged  to maintain  its wage  structure  by increasing  simultaneously  the  pay 
of experienced  workers. 
By making  the elasticity  of labor  supply  low in the short  run and uncer- 
tain  in the long run,  the nonauction  search  mechanism  creates  wage  inertia 
in career  labor  markets  just as it makes  prices  sticky  in customer  product 
markets.  Moreover,  the quit-rate  function  may discourage  wage changes 
much  as the "information  card"  decision  discourages  price  changes.  That 
aspect  of wage  stickiness  can be illustrated  by the following  model.  A firm 
has  two classes  of workers-experienced  and  new;  their  wage  differential  is 
fixed  by custom  or convention.  Thus,  the firm  has a single  wage decision; 
that,  in turn,  will  determine  the quit  rate  of experienced  workers,  and  hence 
the  residual  number  of them  who stick  with  their  jobs. So long as the firm's 
optimal  employment  exceeds  that level,  it will be hiring  some  new workers 
out of its queue  of applicants,  whose  quality  (innate  skill,  education,  expe- 
rience)  may be assumed  to have a distinct  and identifiable  gradient.  For 
any given  wage,  the deeper  the firm  must  dip into the queue,  the lower  will 
be the productivity  (average  and marginal)  of new workers.  Thus, the 
quality  of new  workers  will  depend  positively  on the  wage  and  negatively  on 
the level of employment. 
By setting  a higher  wage,  the firm  gains  by reducing  the quit rate of ex- 
perienced  workers  and by raising  the quality  of its queue.  It pays for that, 
of course,  with a bigger  payroll.  If the supply  of new applicants  of given 
quality  and the quit rate of experienced  workers  were  both smooth con- 
tinuous  functions  of the wage,  the optimum  wage would  turn out to be a 
continuous  increasing  function  of the level of employment.  But the quit 
rate of experienced  workers  is likely to be discontinuous-low and fairly 
insensitive  for wages at or above the level that fulfills  the firm's  implicit 
long-term  obligation  to be fair,  but  jumping  discretely  for  wages  below  that 
level. If the discontinuity  around  the "fair"  wage  is substantial,  that wage 
may be optimal  for a wide range  of employment  levels. 
In the event  of a sudden  deterioration  of the labor  market,  wage  reduc- 
tions  may  not play  much  of a role  (even  for a nonunion  employer).  A firm 
that has sought to establish  a prospect  of rising wages over the career 
horizon  may  destroy  its investment  by cutting  wages.  To cut wages  and  yet 
avoid a long-term  worsening  of the quit rate, the firm  must prove to the 
experienced  worker  that it is "forced"  to take such action,  which  may be 
possible  only  if the firm  is on the brink  of bankruptcy  or at least of a shut- Arthur  M. Okun  369 
down.  Otherwise,  pay cuts could  be interpreted  by workers  as an "unfair" 
action by the employer to capture a larger share of the surplus.33 
When  the alternatives  are temporary  layoffs  and wage  cuts, the former 
are  likely  to be the lesser  evil to the firm.  To be sure,  they are an evil: ex- 
perienced  workers  care  about  steadiness  of employment  as weli  as the wage 
rate,  and a laid-off  worker  may find a better  job before  he is recalled.  In 
fact, however,  wage premiums  in many  industries  are sufficiently  large  to 
bring  most laid-off  workers  back when they are recalled.34  Moreover,  as 
Baily has recently  pointed out, layoffs have several  partial  offsets  in the 
form  of transfer  income  and some  value of leisure.35  Finally,  and I believe 
particularly  important,  the firm has clean hands in the case of a layoff; 
since it is not using  the worker,  it cannot be "taking  advantage"  of him. 
All in all, it is easy to understand  how the convention  that wages  are cut 
only in extremis became  entrenched  in labor markets  before  unions  were 
significant  and before  Keynes  attached  so much weight  to the downward 
rigidity. 
For many of the same  reasons,  a weakening  of labor markets  may not 
even  substantially  reduce  the short-run  rate  of wage  increase  in career  jobs. 
The big issue  in wage  setting  is a long-run  battle  over  the division  of the bi- 
lateral monopoly surplus  between employers  and experienced  workers. 
Each side perceives  the short-run  elasticity  of the other  as relatively  low, 
but the long-run  elasticity  as substantial.  Hence, workers  do not want to 
squeeze  the firm  into gradual  extinction;  and the firm does not want to 
press  the workers  to the point of explosive  quit rates.  These boundaries, 
however,  may contain  a wide area of sharp  conflict  of interest;  and stan- 
dards  of fairness  are sought  to preserve  the surplus  available  to the two 
sides  combined. 
CRITERIA IN WAGE DETERMINATION 
Various  groups  of employers  and  workers  may  opt for  different  standards 
of "fairness":  gearing  wages  to other  wages  or to product  prices,  or to con- 
33. Some case studies  of the extreme  conditions  that  justify pay cuts are presented  by 
Peter Henle, "Reverse Collective Bargaining?  A  Look at Some Union Concession 
Situations,"  Industrial  and  Labor  Relationis  Review,  vol. 26 (April 1973), pp. 956-68. 
34. Harold  L. Sheppard  and A. Harvey  Belitsky,  The  Job Hunt  (Johns  Hopkins  Press, 
1966),  pp. 35-37. 
35. Martin  Neil Baily, "Wages  and Employment  under  Uncertain  Demand,"  Review 
of Economic  Studies,  vol. 41 (January  1974),  pp. 43-47. The psychic  cost of unemploy- 
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sumer  prices.  Any of these  standards  will weaken  the impact  of changing 
labor-market  conditions,  and strengthen  the momentum  of a given  rate  of 
wage  increase. 
Wage-wage  patterns.  One  method  of achieving  "fairness"  involves  emu- 
lating  the wages  recently  set by other  firms.  The comparability  system  for 
compensation  of federal  employees  is the most important  example  of this 
practice,  but similar  methods  are used in many private  firms.  And many 
smaller  industries  "pattern"  on steel  or autos  in their  collective-bargaining 
settlements.  Such  patterning  lends  inertia  to the  rate  of wage  increase  in the 
economy.  In particular,  overlapping  schedules  of contracts  of long duration 
may result  in a wage settlement  that is a moving average  of other  recent 
wage settlements  that were in turn moving averages  of previous  moving 
averages. 
Wage-product  price patterns. Alternatively, long-attachment wages may 
follow  product  prices.  Recent  price  hikes  by the employer  that  widened  his 
profit  margin  can  be legitimately  viewed  by labor  as increasing  its marginal 
revenue  product  and  hence  warranting  a pay advance.  On the other  hand, 
recent  rises  in the firm's  price  that  merely  reflected  a passthrough  of previ- 
ous  increases  in labor  or material  costs,  with  an unchanged  markup,  should 
make  no case for further  wage  gains.36 
Wages and consumer prices. Finally,  consumer prices may  influence 
wages.  Presumably,  one of the attractions  of a career  job is the prospect  of 
a reasonably  secure  and rising  standard  of living for the long run. If the 
cost of living  increases  sharply  relative  to wages  (or if the  real-wage  outlook 
merely  becomes  far more  uncertain),  the worker  may see less value to his 
job, perhaps  enough  less to quit, even with no evidence  that his wage  has 
deteriorated  relative  to the  (unknown)  alternatives.  And  if the cost of living 
would affect  quit rates at given wages,  it will influence  wages-in  a way 
that need  not depend  on a mythical  real-wage  effect  on leisure. 
If the risk of a price-wage  squeeze  imposes  a serious  disutility  on the 
worker,  unions  will  seek  wage  adjustments  informally  geared  to past  move- 
36. Many wage equations  in the early sixties included the profit  margin  as an inde- 
pendent variable.  See Richard G. Lipsey and M. D. Steuer, "The Relation between 
Profits  and Wage Rates," Economica,  n.s., vol. 28 (May 1961),  pp. 137-55; Otto Eck- 
stein  and Thomas  A. Wilson,  "The Determination  of Money Wages  in American  Indus- 
try," Quarterly  Journal  of Economics,  vol. 76 (August 1962), pp. 388-401; George L. 
Perry,  Unemployment,  Money Wage  Rates,  and  Iniflation  (M.I.T. Press, 1966),  pp. 27-29, 
48-52. The profit  squeeze  and wage bulge of subsequent  years  made the fit deteriorate, 
so the variable  dropped  out-but  not for analytical  reasons.  In part, Perry  puts it back 
in his discussion  of income shares  in the article  in this issue. Arthur  M. Okun  371 
ments of consumer prices or formal escalator clauses (even though an opti- 
mal bargaining  strategy would depend on the ability to pay of the employer 
as well as the ability to consume of the worker). 
On reasonable assumptions, the worker should prefer a contract for the 
next three years that offers certainty about his real  wage to  one with the 
same expected value that provides a certain nominal wage (and hence an 
uncertain real wage).  On  standard assumptions of  one-sector inflation 
models, the employer who must commit himself for three years would also 
be expected to make the same choice. Surely, the wage escalator should re- 
duce risk for firms in cyclical industries where product demand (and hence 
the ability to pass increased labor costs into product prices) is typically 
highly correlated with movements of overall consumer prices. The fact that 
formal escalators are the exception rather than the rule reveals a defect in 
the standard theory. Why do employers uniformly resist escalators, even in 
industry-wide  bargaining?  In a few conversations I have had with sophisti- 
cated businessmen on this issue, their explanations illustrate vividly the 
importance of certainty about nominal future costs in customer product 
markets. Some mention the need to make fixed-price  bids or to accept fixed- 
price orders for production processes of long duration. More generally, 
they insist on the importance of planning in terms of dollars. They stress 
vulnerability to  interproduct and international competition  in  a  world 
where escalator clauses are rare. They view their future financial resources 
as given in nominal, and not constant, dollars. When they have to decide 
on a purchase of labor-saving machinery, they want to compare its price 
with some known price for labor over as long a horizon as possible. 
Even if, for such reasons, the escalator imposes a net cost on the em- 
ployer, the firm may recover that cost with an offer of lower expected value 
if the insurance is worth a lot to the worker. Thus, escalators may be an 
efficient element in the wage bargain. In fact, they have spread in recent 
years, although really strong uncapped ones are limited to a few major in- 
dustries. All in all, consumer prices influence wages through both formal 
escalators and informal cost-of-living adjustments-ruling  out any pure 
case of a "one-shot" rise in the cost of living. 
INFLATIONARY  BIAS IN WAGES 
Of the various features of a career  labor market outlined above, only the 
downward rigidity of the wage level points to an inflationary  bias in wages. 
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can have sufficiently  adverse long-term effects on quit rates to become un- 
profitable  for employers. The qualitative significance of zero as a floor has 
no parallel for any ceiling. While downward rigidity in this sense can im- 
portantly  raise the mean wage increase  if much of the frequency  distribution 
of wage changes would otherwise lie below zero, it cannot have any influ- 
ence when the entire frequency distribution lies in the positive range. 
Apart from downward rigidity, an inflationary bias might arise from an 
asymmetry following a regularly scheduled wage increase or a collective- 
bargaining settlement. The firm still retains the option of "overfulfilling" 
its pledge, by awarding extra wage increases or Christmas bonuses if labor 
markets should tighten dramatically. But it cannot underfulfill with nega- 
tive Christmas  bonuses. The resulting phenomenon of upward "wage drift" 
introduces a long-term bias if any of the temporary bulge becomes perma- 
nent (as seems likely, if only because it gets into prices in the interim). 
A third possible source of inflationary bias arises because the strike is a 
recurrent  threat that may disrupt any static equilibrium for union wages. 
Analytical models typically suggest that, while monopoly power of unions 
may lead to high wages, that power, once exercised, should not speed the 
rise of wages over time. But because the strike threat is the enforcement in- 
strument of the union's (bilateral) monopoly power, that standard conclu- 
sion is not airtight. In any formal contract, the union makes the concession 
of disarming itself and burying the strike threat for, say, the three-year 
duration. When the contract expires, it once again has the opportunity to 
exercise that threat; conceivably, it may seek an additional payment from 
the firm in return for three more years of disarmament.37 
In summary, career labor markets make wages less sensitive to labor- 
market conditions, rigid downward, and subject to a zone of indeterminacy 
and possibly to an inflationary bias. They also create indeterminacy in the 
bargaining  process, permitting widely varying results in different  periods of 
history and different countries on the extent to which wages follow labor- 
market tightness, wages, product prices, or consumer prices. Some charac- 
teristics of wage behavior are predictable: the rate of wage increase will 
have momentum; it will ultimately respond to market conditions; it will 
show downward rigidity. Once adopted, a particular pattern of wage fol- 
37. This argument  does not imply that the union will capture  an ever-larger  share  of 
the bilateral  surplus  in successive  rounds  of bargaining.  For one thing,  market  conditions 
do change;  for another,  firms  would ultimately  find it worthwhile  to resist  further  wage 
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lowing will persist for some time. But it will change and evolve, and it will 
defy any general  theory with empirical content that is meant to comprehend 
all labor markets in all countries at all times-as  is confirmed by Perry's 
analysis of worldwide wage experience in this issue.38 
Inflation  in the Mixed Customer-Auction  Economy 
In the real world, a few products are sold on organized auction markets; 
a few strictly fit the customer-market  model with price tags based on a non- 
cyclical markup over past costs; many lie between these poles; and some 
may reflect forces that are neither market clearing nor customer oriented. 
While no labor is marketed in a pure auction exchange, labor markets 
cover a spectrum of wage flexibility. In this sense as well as in many others, 
it is a mixed economy. 
Figure 1 illustrates the mix in product markets, showing the contrasting 
behavior of four price indexes in selected periods of varying inflationary 
pressure. The sensitive industrial materials index, bar D,  approximates 
pure auction prices; it is volatile, often declines, and responds promptly to 
changes in aggregate demand pressure. A broader group of wholesale in- 
dustrial materials, whose price changes are shown by bar C, is not quite so 
volatile, less apt to fall, and less prompt to respond. (The unusual relative 
behavior of bars C and D over the period 1973:4 to 1974:4 stems from the 
inclusion of petroleum in C, but not in D.) Wholesale prices for finished 
products (bar B) are less "auction-like" in behavior than either C or D, 
while the private nonfarm deflator (bar A)  is the least auction-like and 
most dominated by customer prices. 
A SIMPLE ALGEBRAIC MODEL 
A simple algebraic model can describe some of the mechanisms of infla- 
tion in the mixed economy. For convenience, I shall focus on the auction- 
38. Throughout,  some of the phenomena  that I view as conventional  could be con- 
ceptualized  as expectational.  (The indeterminacy  is there in either case.) In part, this 
choice is a matter  of analytical  taste. For example,  I would describe  the current  salaries 
of baseball  players  as based on last year's performance  and argue that this convention 
rests on the long-term  attachment  that provides  an incentive  and a payoff  for every  year 
(except  the final  one in each  career).  Chicago  and Minnesota  economists  would  insist  that 
the pay is an expected  value where  last year's  performance  provides  the best estimate  of 
this year's.  As I see it, the analytical  principle  of Occam's  razor  supports  my preference, 
but perhaps  an even more ancient principle  applies: de gustibus  non est disputandum. o~~~~~~~~~~~  - 
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customer  dichotomy  in product  markets  rather  than  that in labor  markets. 
I shall  assume  that customer  prices  are set by a markup  over cost with a 
one-period  lag, while  auction  prices  clear  markets.  I shall  also assume  that 
all the costs of customer  products  (and  none of the costs of auction  items) 
are wages.  For simplicity,  the supply  of auction-priced  items is taken as 
completely  inelastic  over  some  significant  short  period,  while  the output  of 
customer  items  can be expanded  at constant  real costs. Moreover,  I shall 
initially  ignore  any changes  in stocks of auction  items  (treating  them all 
like fresh  fish). 
Also for simplicity,  income  and price  elasticities  of demand  are  taken  as 
unity  for  both  types  of products,  so that  each  captures  a fixed  share  of total 
expenditures.  For the moment,  I shall note merely  that wages, W, may 
depend  upon prices,  P, in both sectors,  output, Q, in the customer  sector 
(which  reflects  the strength  of demand),  and  lagged  wages,  W-1.  The  model 
can be represented  by the following  four equations: 
(1)  PAQA =  aY 
(2)  PCQC  (1  -  a)7 
(3)  PC =  bW1 
(4)  W = f(PA ,PC, Qc, W1), 
where  the A subscript  refers  to auction  items,  and the C subscript  to cus- 
tomer  items; F is nominal  income,  which  (like QA)  is taken as exogenous. 
Initially,  suppose  that prices  in both sectors  are constant  and so is in- 
come.  Now income  starts  rising  persistently  at a rate  of m percent,  perhaps 
because  of stimulative  monetary  or fiscal  policies.  The  auction-priced  items 
immediately  have  an inflation  rate  of m. But the inflation  rate of customer 
items  initially  is zero, while  their  output  expands  at the rate of m. 
Developments  in subsequent  periods  depend  on the behavior  of wages. 
In the extreme  case where  wages  are absolutely  rigid, 
(4a)  W =  constant, 
the inflation  in the auction  sector  and the expansion  of output  in the cus- 
tomer's  sector  would both continue  at the same rate of m. The inflation 
would  never  spread  to the customer  sector,  and real wage rates  would  be 
squeezed  although  real payrolls  would  be maintained. 
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(and  hence  employment  demand)  in the customer  sector,  but not to prices: 
(4b)  W/W-1  =  (QC/QC),9 
where  QC  is the initial  "noninflationary  level"  and  0 < s <  1. In this  case, 
Pc starts  rising  after one period  and keeps  rising  at an increasingly  rapid 
rate  that  ultimately  reaches  m and thus  matches  the rate  of increase  of PA. 
But the ultimate  ratio of PC/PA  is below its initial  value by m/s. And the 
equilibrium  value  of log (Qc/ QC)  is also  m/s. Finally,  the  equilibrium  value 
of PC/W  is m below  the initial  ratio.  Thus,  real product  wages  are up and 
profit  margins  on customer  items  are  down.  Real wages  measured  in terms 
of consumer  prices  may,  however,  be up or down  depending  on the weight 
of auction  items  in the cost of living.  Thus,  the initial  inflationary  phase  in 
which  auction  prices  rise faster  than  customer  prices  (and wages)  "perma- 
nently"  changes  relative  prices.39 
Finally, suppose  wages iespond fully and immediately  to the cost of 
living,  but not at all to the state of the labor  market: 
(4c)  W/WO =  (PA/PAO)  k(PC/PC 0)l, 
where  k is the weight  of auction  items  in the cost of living.  It is convenient 
to set PAO  =  PcO  =  bWo =  1. Remarkably, every single result of this model 
corresponds  to that  based  on (4b),  with  the mere  substitution  of k for  s. The 
(4c)  variant  does  make  real  wages  in terms  of consumer  prices  determinately 
constant,  but the other changes  in relative  prices  that emerge  from (4b) 
apply  here  as well. 
With  both (4b) and  (4c), ending  the growth  of nominal  income  does not 
halt  inflation  promptly,  although  auction  prices  stop  inflating  at once.  Cus- 
tomer  prices  still register  past wage  increases,  while  wages  keep  rising  as a 
result  of tight labor  markets-in (4b)-or  of continuing  advances  in cus- 
tomer  prices-in (4c). Thus, inflation  damps  down only gradually. 
Interesting  further  possibilities  can be entertained  by relaxing  some of 
the restrictive  assumptions  made above and thus allowing  for more com- 
plex  lags,  partial  responses  of wages  to the  cost of living,  labor  inputs  in the 
auction  sector,  differential  price  and income  elasticities  in the two sectors, 
auction-priced  materials  that are embodied  in final  products,  variations  in 
the output  of the auction  sector,  changing  real  costs  of producing  customer 
items,  and inertia  in wage  increases. 
39. With  PcO  = PAO = 1, the solution to the first-order  difference  equation  for Pc is 
log Pct  =  nit -  m/s  +  (m/s)(l  -  s)t; while log PA,  =  mt. 378  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1975 
Several  results  appear  to be robust for a wide class of such models: 
(1) The rate of inflation  can be viewed  as depending  on (a) the size of the 
impact  on the auction  sector,  and (b) the speed  of transmission  (generally 
through  wages) to the customer  sector. (2) A rise in the inflation  rate 
changes  relative  prices,  because  the auction  prices  get out in front  and the 
others  do not catch  up. (3) The  more  the output  of a sector  can  rise,  the  less 
its price  tends  to go up. (4) Realized  markups  are squeezed  wherever  costs 
are passed  through  with a lag. (5) Inflation  starts  slowly but builds  up a 
momentum  that  keeps  it going  even  after  its initiating  source  is eliminated.40 
The implied  squeeze  on the profit  margins  of customer  firms during  in- 
flation  raises  interesting  questions.  To be sure, so long as their output  is 
rising  rapidly  in an inflationary  boom, their  margins  in the real world  are 
buoyed  up by a cyclical  productivity  bonus that does not appear  in these 
models.  Yet the implied  influence  of inflation  per se-as  distinct  from  ex- 
panding  output-in  squeezing  margins  may have some verisimilitude.  It 
clearly  applies  to public utilities  and may apply to customer-strategy  in- 
dustries  that are self-regulatory  in their passthrough  of costs. And since 
customer-strategy  firms  account  for most U.S. equities,  this squeeze  could 
even be one of the reasons  why the stock market  does not perform  well 
during  inflationary  times.4' 
Because  customer  prices  lag behind  costs in these models, real wages 
measured  in terms  of those prices  are increased  by inflation,  regardless  of 
how  wage  rates  themselves  are  determined.  The  typical  empirical  result  that 
real wages  deflated  by total consumer  prices  have no distinct  cyclical  pat- 
tern may indeed suggest  that they are procyclical  in terms of customer 
prices  alone. Of course,  this result conflicts  sharply  with the traditional 
Keynesian  view that employment  could increase  only with declining  real 
wages.  But Keynes'  belief in that classical  proposition  rested  on the as- 
sumption  that firms  typically  operated  with diminishing  marginal  product 
of labor,  a thesis  that  has long since  been  exploded  by the facts  on cyclical 
productivity.41 
40. These models closely resemble  one constructed  by James Duesenberry  way back 
in 1950.  See "The Mechanics  of Inflation,"  Review  of Economics  and Statistics,  vol. 32 
(May 1950),  pp. 144-49. Also, compare  the models  used by Robert  J. Gordon  to analyze 
food inflation  in "Alternative  Responses  of Policy to External  Supply  Shocks,"  BPEA, 
1:1975,  pp. 185-94. 
41. Note, however,  that FIFO profits  are  pulled  down only to the extent  that the cost- 
passthrough  lag is longer than the inventory  lag. Several  aspects of cyclical movements 
in profit  margins  are explored  by Charles  Schultze  in his paper  in this issue. 
42. See Okun, "Upward  Mobility,"  pp. 211-13. Arthur  M. Okun  379 
ASSETS AND  INTEREST RATES 
When  inventories  of auction  items are brought  into the analysis,  they 
play a key role, building  a bridge  to monetary  theory. Suppose  auction 
markets  are  "efficient"  in the sense  that  all worthwhile  information  is com- 
piled  and  digested  by traders  and  reflected  promptly  in market  prices.  Then 
the demand  for inventories  of auction  items  (like cotton)  will be geared  to 
price  expectations;  cotton  (or a futures  contract  in it) is potentially  a port- 
folio asset  for anyone  who expects  its price  to soar.  However,  for customer 
items  (like dacron),  which  are  extremely  illiquid,  stock  demands  are  essen- 
tially transactions  balances  of producers,  distributors,  and ultimate  con- 
sumers;  those stocks are likely to be much less sensitive  to inflation  and 
interest  rates than are auction stocks. To be sure, cost expectations  (for 
wage rates and the like) can influence  sellers,  and price  expectations  can 
induce  intertemporal  shifts  by buyers  (like  the bulge  in car sales  in August 
1974),  but their  scope and magnitude  seem  sharply  limited. 
Given  an emerging  inflation,  the responses  of asset  markets  in a mixed 
world  will differ  from  those of a pure  auction  world.  In the latter  (with a 
sufficient  sprinkling  of assumptions),  a jump in nominal  interest  rates  by 
the expected  rate of inflation  will keep  portfolios  in equilibrium  for every 
asset  except  non-interest-bearing  cash.  The  induced  economizing  on money 
holdings  produces  the  single  adverse  allocative  effect  of inflation  recognized 
in standard  theory-additional  trips  to the bank.  But  those  answers  cannot 
apply  to the world  of two classes  of real  assets,  with  the high  inflation  rate 
on cotton  and  the  lower  (and  less  relevant)  one on dacron.  Nominal  interest 
rates  cannot  rise  enough  to equilibrate  the demand  for cotton  stocks  at the 
pre-inflationary  level  without  creating  an excess  supply  of loans  and  dacron 
stocks. 
As a result,  the rise  in nominal  interest  rates  must  leave some expected 
net return  from  cotton  speculation  and thus  maintain  some  additional  de- 
mand  for  cotton  inventories,  limited  by  the  high  (and  presumably  increased) 
risk of holding  these stocks. Sophisticated,  wealthy,  and risk-neutral  (or 
relatively  less risk-averse)  investors  are handed  a windfall  by the oppor- 
tunity  for speculation  on cotton. Moreover,  the buildup  of cotton stocks 
and  any  possible  induced  holddown  (or buildup)  of dacron  stocks  lengthen 
the  list of real  allocative  effects  of inflation:  there  are  changes  in the sched- 
ule of trips  to lots of suppliers,  not just to suppliers  of money. 
While  the expected  inflation  rate on cotton thus sets an upper  limit on 
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why the expected inflation rate on dacron should be a lower limit. Surely, 
nothing guarantees or even suggests that the premium will correspond to 
the weights of dacron and cotton in any overall price index, or that any 
general "real"  interest rate, however defined, will remain stable, or that the 
premium thus will offer reasonable insurance to savers who want to hedge 
against inflation. It is predictable that the structure of interest rates will be 
altered, because the financial sector is also a mixed auction-customer  world. 
Because thrift institutions borrow short and lend long, they must pursue a 
customer "pricing" strategy, passing through the sluggish yields on their 
portfolios in the form of sluggish interest rates to their depositors. The cus- 
tomer strategy has more fundamental causes than the government ceiling 
on interest, which is really an effort to preserve its viability. In any case, the 
interest rate received by depositors does not compensate them at all fully 
for increased inflation. 
The role and importance of money and near-moneys become clear in a 
mixed world. In a hypothetical world of universal, frictionless auction mar- 
kets, every product is liquid, and a well-diversified  portfolio of commodities 
should dominate over demand deposits. It is precisely because customer 
items are illiquid assets with sluggish prices that fixed-dollar assets are so 
attractive to households who may need to spend for automobiles, appen- 
dectomies, college tuition, life-insurance premiums, and property-tax bills 
at uncertain times in the future.43 
An inflationary world with greater  volatility of overall prices and of rela- 
tive prices reduces the "real" services provided by liquid assets in ways that 
do not get recorded on balance sheets. The typical household is offered no 
reliable escape, even if it correctly anticipates inflation. Commodity mar- 
kets are too risky; equity markets reflect the problems of customer-product 
firms; borrowing more to accelerate purchases of customer-priced autos 
and appliances is generally a losing strategy (1974 provided an exception); 
only homebuying offers hope for salvation, and then only to a limited num- 
ber of families in those intervals when mortgages are available. Ample 
reasons emerge for the empirical fact that consumers save more in response 
to previously unanticipated inflation.44 The diminished real wealth from 
43. See Leijonhufvud,  On Keynesian  Economics, pp. 80-81; Karl Brunner  and Allan 
H. Meltzer,  "The Uses of Money: Money in the Theory of an Exchange  Economy," 
American Economic Review, vol.  61 (December  1971), pp. 784-805. 
44. George Katona stressed that fact for years to a skeptical profession; see The 
Poweifil Consumer  (McGraw-Hill,  1960).  See also F. Thomas  Juster  and Paul Wachtel, 
"Inflation  and the Consumer,"  BPEA, 1:1972,  pp. 71-114. Arthur  M. Okun  381 
nominal assets and the adverse "income effect" associated with greater  risk 
and uncertainty apparently swamp incentives to  shift into  goods.  And 
households may save particularly in liquid form in order to bolster their 
dwindling ratio of cash reserves to income and consumption. Thus, in a 
variety of ways, the new mixed world makes sense of the old story that in- 
flation discriminates against the unsophisticated saver and investor, re- 
distributing wealth from "suckers" to "sharpies." 
Inflation may also stimulate investment in plant and equipment by auc- 
tion industries and depress it in customer industries. The latter may well be 
confronted with an increased real interest rate (in terms of their product 
prices). Even if they are not, they may respond negatively to an equal rise in 
nominal interest rates and inflation rates. A number of businessmen have 
told me that their firms initially and tentatively evaluate a proposed new 
plant by estimating how  its  output (at  some  "normal" operating rate) 
would contribute to profits, assuming that the product will be sold, and all 
inputs bought, at current  prices. That initial estimate of profitability will be 
depressed when lenders are getting some inflation premium in nominal 
interest rates-unless  the firm assumes enough inflation of its product price 
(relative to that of variable inputs) to recoup this inflation premium. As I 
heard one businessman express his feelings, "I hate to make an investment 
that can be bailed out only by inflation." In effect, even if his best estimate 
is that he can push up prices fast enough to recoup the inflation premium, 
he feels greater  uncertainty about profitability and hence greater  reluctance 
to invest. 
In summary, inflation has far more pervasive influences on portfolio 
choices than the traditionally  hypothesized shift from nominal assets to real 
assets. It may push them away from nominal assets, customer items, equi- 
ties of customer firms, and perhaps even physical capital of customer firms 
into auction commodities and those few other real assets that are reason- 
ably liquid, like real estate. 
ADAPTATION  AND  ACCELERATION 
The institutions of the customer sector are geared to a basically noninfla- 
tionary world. And they have to adapt if the world becomes and remains 
inflationary. Some of these adaptations are taking place today. Customer- 
strategy firms are trying to widen their markups. They are shortening the 
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frequently; they are departing from historical cost calculations and trying 
to anticipate future cost increases. Many firms have begun to think and 
price LIFO as well as to report LIFO profits; they are focusing anew on the 
gap between replacement and original costs of capital in setting prices; 
some have ended the practice of accepting orders with fixed delivery prices, 
while others are putting future cost increases into those prices; some firms 
have instituted wage and pension escalators and have shortened labor con- 
tract periods. They are searching for new formulas and yardsticks to sup- 
plant the dollar yardstick. More and more investors are learning to partici- 
pate in commodity markets and real-estate ventures. Lenders who  need 
certainty of  capital value are increasingly reluctant to  make long-term 
commitments. 
Most of these adaptations shorten the lags and increase the intensity of 
inflation associated with any given level of real economic activity. Thus, 
they generate an adverse shift of the short-run Phillips curve that reflects 
the inflationary experience of the past. That shift accords with the predic- 
tion of the accelerationist model, although the mechanism of acceleration 
is very different from that implied by a natural unemployment rate and a 
particular expected inflation rate. I believe the United States is currently 
suffering  from an acceleration resulting from such adaptations to past in- 
flation, as well as from the momentum of the more normal long lags in 
customer and career markets. 
The gradualness and the costliness of these adaptations reveal the great 
dependence of customer institutions on the dollar yardstick. The adapta- 
tions require new techniques of management control, new-and  perhaps 
inherently less efficient-kinds  of customer and employee relationships, 
and a new breed of accountants. The innovators find themselves out of step 
and unable to communicate with their customers, suppliers, lenders, and 
government tax collectors or regulators. And so the economy adapts to 
inflation  at only a tortoise's pace, even though everyone expects inflation to 
continue at least at a mule's (if not a hare's) pace. 
Implications  for Welfare and Policy 
Customer  markets are valuable institutions to society, because informa- 
tion costs are really high. In comparison with a dominantly auction econ- 
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trading in spot and futures transactions and to the negotiation of formal 
contracts. They lower  job turnover and create reasonably predictable  career 
income profiles; they encourage firms to invest in workers and to build 
career ladders for them. They economize on resources devoted to point- 
estimate forecasting of the future. They promote reliance on custom and 
habit. They allow accounting systems and hence orders, capital budgeting, 
and financing to be guided by reliable historical costs rather than conjec- 
tural future costs. They make money and, more generally, fixed-dollar as- 
sets valuable and reasonably reliable claims over a wide range of consumer 
goods and services that may be desired many years in the future. 
Prolonged and intense inflation upsets many habits of economic life, con- 
fronting consumers with price increases and price dispersions that send 
them shopping; making them doubt their ability to maintain their living 
standards, and downgrade the value of their career jobs  and long-term 
savings; and forcing them to compile more information and to try to pre- 
dict the future-costly  and risky activities that they are poorly qualified to 
execute and bound to view with anxiety. The recognition by the consumer 
that economic institutions are gravely disturbed by inflation is an apprecia- 
tion  of  reality-not  money  illusion.  The  illusion-Walrasian-general- 
equilibrium illusion or barter illusion-lies  in the models of an economy 
in which inflation does not matter, offering automatic protection to savers 
through the interest premium on nominal assets and leaving intact the 
relative prices of cotton and dacron and the relative wages of janitors and 
professors. 
The accelerationist is right that, in some respects, people are fooled by 
inflation. But the fooling lies, not so much in disappointing predictions of 
precise outcomes as in undermining the foundations of habit and custom 
that permit one to live without many point-estimate predictions. And the 
institutions of the system provide no vehicles of "unfooling" to transport 
the economy to a no-tradeoff situation of "fully anticipated" inflation and a 
natural unemployment rate. 
I do not know, at this point, how to quantify the benefits of a customer 
economy or how to assess the fraction of those benefits that would be dissi- 
pated by the persistence of rapid and erratic inflation. Clearly, the total 
benefits are large: consider the welfare loss that would be imposed on a 
person forbidden ever again to engage in any economic transaction with 
anyone whom he has voluntarily bought from or sold to in the past-his 
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imposed  by intense  inflation  on these relationships  is not enormous,  but 
neither  is it trivial, given their dependence  on the dollar yardstick.  As 
William  Brainard  suggested  in conversation,  estimates  of the substantial 
costs  associated  with  a shift  to the  metric  system  may  give  some  clues  to the 
much  larger  costs of abandoning  the dollar  yardstick. 
However  these welfare  benefits  are evaluated,  they must be balanced 
against  the welfare  costs of a customer  economy-greater  volatility  of out- 
put  and  employment.  In a recessionary  world  of universal  auction  markets, 
price and wage levels would plunge rapidly  toward zero, allowing the 
Keynes  effect  and  the Pigou  effect  to restore  full  employment.45  And  rapidly 
rising  prices  could similarly  halt booms with a brief  intense  spurt  (rather 
than a long nagging  bout) of inflation. 
Although  I cannot  prove  that  the prevalence  of customer  markets  yields 
a net benefit,  subjectively  I think  the system  is worth  saving.  The ability  of 
the system  to limit the waste of idle resources  and to contain  the infla- 
tionary  bias in wages  looked  pretty  good in the fifties  and sixties,  particu- 
larly  in contrast  to the record  of the thirties  and  the forties.  Indeed,  in that 
tranquil  period,  long-run  attachments  must  have paid off well. Infrequent 
layoffs,  low quit  rates,  good internal  ladders  served  firms  and  career  work- 
ers, while sluggish  cost-based  prices satisfied  customers  and suppliers. 
Those successes  may well have gradually  encouraged  more customer  and 
career  strategies;  and  that,  in turn,  may  contribute  to the  finding  that  wages 
and  prices  have  been  less  responsive  in recent  years  to given  cyclical  move- 
ments  of real activity.46 
STEADY INFLATION 
Some  proposed  policy  strategies  with  respect  to inflation  seek  an alterna- 
tive yardstick  for the dollar.  The proponents  of steady  inflation-rather 
than  low inflation-would set a target  of stability  in the first  derivative  of 
the value  of the dollar  rather  than  in its level.  The steadily  shrinking  dollar 
45. To do so, they would have to outweigh  any negative  impact of deflationary  ex- 
pectations  on investment  demand and have to escape any liquidity  trap. Like Robert 
Hall (in his article  in this issue), I would expect a high degree  of downward  wage and 
price  flexibility  to restore  full employment.  But, unlike  him, I would attach  a large  social 
cost to wage and price  volatility. 
46. See Cagan,  Hydra-Headed  Monster,  pp. 2-8. Tobin points  to the declining  agricul- 
tural  share  of employment  and GNP in the postwar  era as another  possible  contributor. 
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may  be a reasonable  yardstick,  but  it has  to be second  best-just as a 5 per- 
cent annual  decline  in the length  of a "yard"  would  be inferior  to stability. 
I can see two possible  arguments  for the compromise  goal of steady  in- 
flation,  but I find  neither  persuasive.  First,  if the key difficulty  of stabiliza- 
tion stemmed  from  the downward  rigidity  of the level of wages,  it could  be 
sensible  to aim at a normal  inflation  rate that kept nearly  all wage  move- 
ments  in the positive  range-so that absolute  cuts in wage  rates  in signifi- 
cant  sectors  would  not be needed  to achieve  the desired  macro-equilibrium. 
Second,  if the  economy  were  fairly  well  adapted  to some  particular  inflation 
rate  (like  5 percent),  it might  not be worth  the  transitional  cost  to wring  that 
inflation  out of the system.  As I have argued  above,  however,  the adapta- 
tions are  limited  adjustments  to varying  and  uncertain  inflation  (which  still 
leave the system  heavily  dependent  on the doliar yardstick),  rather  than 
full adjustments  to any particular  inflation  rate. 
The main  problem  of steady  inflation  as a goal is its lack of credibility. 
Targeting  on a stable  first derivative  is admitting  failure  in the effort  to 
stabilize  the level. Why should anyone  expect  any greater  success  in sta- 
bilizing  the rate of change  of the price  level than in stabilizing  the price 
level?  Moreover,  in the context  of the model  of this paper,  steady  inflation 
requires  such a full adaptation  that the same expected  inflation  rate can 
pertain  to dacron  and cotton, and to the wages  of professors  and  janitors. 
Steady  inflation  strikes  me as even more of a mirage  than when I first 
called  it that four years  ago.47 
INDEXATION 
Another  proposed  strategy  for policy would substitute  for the dollar 
yardstick  a new cost-of-living  unit through  indexation  of incomes,  assets, 
debts, and taxes. Thus far, explicit  cost-of-living  adjustments  have been 
enacted  for social  security  and for federal  retirement  benefits,  and both of 
the  formulas  written  into  law  involve  serious  technical  defects.48  Apparently, 
construction  of a substitute  yardstick  is not a trivial  task. 
The most far-reaching  proposal  would promote  wage indexation  as a 
general  practice.  Through  indexation,  career  wages would respond  more 
47. See "Mirage  of Steady Inflation." 
48. The defect in social security is discussed in Barry M. Blechman, Edward M. 
Gramlich,  and  Robert  W.  Hartman,  Setting  National  Priorities:  The  1976  Budget 
(Brookings  Institution,  1975), pp. 175, 182; that in federal  retirement  introduces  a re- 
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promptly  and  more  fully  to changes  in the prices  of auction  products  and  in 
flexible  wages.  As Robert  J. Gordon  has convincingly  argued,  that  must  be 
socially  undesirable  when  the changes  in auction  prices  result  from  changes 
in supply.49  But when the price changes are demand induced, presumably 
indexed  wages  would  more  nearly  approximate  the "shadow  equilibrium" 
wages  of an auction  labor  market. 
A program  of universal  wage escalators  would represent  an effort to 
breathe  life into the textbook  auction  model  (accompanied  by a hope that 
supply  shifts would rarely  be the culprit).  In the indexed  world, like the 
auction  world,  the price  level would  be volatile  and would  respond  rapidly 
to aggregate  demand;  hence,  a nonaccommodating  monetary  policy  would 
automatically  unleash  the Keynes  and Pigou effects  in the early  stages  of 
inflation.  Moreover,  because  the decreased  inflation  resulting  from  restric- 
tive discretionary  policies  would  emerge  with  a much  shorter  lag behind  the 
reduced  output and employment,  such policies  might become  politically 
more  feasible.  The thesis  is that, if inflation  "hangs  out" sooner,  it will be 
stopped  sooner.  I find  the argument  intriguing,  but not persuasive. 
The equity  case for wage indexation  seems  even less persuasive.  To be 
sure, escalators  make the real wage of an indexed  worker  less dependent 
upon such  arbitrary  elements  as the timing  of his contract  or the effective- 
ness of his union  leader.  And they  may  help to resolve  conflict  by keeping 
inflation  issues  out of the wage  bargain.  At the same  time,  by increasing  the 
volatility  of price  movements,  they must exacerbate  the uncertainty  and 
variability  of real  incomes  for those who have no escalators.  If indexing  is 
less than universal,  its equity  effects  must be uncertain. 
And  if indexing  became  universal  for  wages,  contracts  for  future  delivery, 
claims,  and taxes,  the market-basket  unit would  become  the yardstick  and 
the numeraire  of the economy,  and the price  level would become  highly 
unstable.  Clearly,  the price  system  would  go haywire  if all the sellers  of the 
items  in a comprehensive  market  basket  set "real  prices"  in market-basket 
units  (only by magic  would  the prices  add up to unity).  Now suppose  they 
aim  collectively  at a real  price  that  exceeds  unity,  but they  have  to set price 
tags  in dollars.  If everybody's  price  is geared  to full escalation  with  a short 
lag, the inconsistency  of real aims must result  in explosive  inflation.  The 
price  system  can work  with  gold,  peanuts,  or dollars  as the standard,  but it 
cannot  work  on an all-inclusive  market-basket  standard.  To put it another 
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way, the money  equation  would  be pushed  out of the general-equilibrium 
system,  making  that system  insoluble. 
All things  considered,  I suspect  as good (or as bad) a case can be made 
for a social  effort  to discourage  the responsiveness  of career  wages  to cost- 
of-living  movements  as for one to promote  it. If the link could be broken 
entirely,  inflation  would  be more  narrowly  confined  to auction  markets  and 
limited  by a different  kind  of automatic  stabilizer-a squeeze  on consumer 
demand due to  depressed  real labor income. Transitory  inflationary 
shocks  might  then  blow  themselves  out with  much  less impact  on the price 
level.  The  political  process  might  even  be improved  because  inflation  would 
squeeze  the majority  of voters  harder. 
POLICIES FOR THE AUCTION  SECTOR 
If instead of designing  alternative  yardsticks,  policymakers  should be 
aiming  to save the dollar  yardstick,  then they must recognize  the special 
role of the auction  sector.  While auction  items may not be the source  of 
excess  demand,  they  will  be the source  of major  price  increases.  Speculation 
on auction-product  inventories  in a strong cyclical  upswing  is not a re- 
sponse to any genuine  change  of relative  scarcities,  and serves  no social 
function  that  I can  see.  Huge  price  increases  of auction  items  impose  macro- 
economic  welfare  costs  by transmitting  both inflation  and,  through  restric- 
tive fiscal-monetary  policies,  underutilization  to customer  and career  mar- 
kets.50  For these  reasons,  public  stocks  of auction  items,  measures  to ensure 
adequate  and reliable  domestic  supplies,  and government  disincentives  to 
cyclically  speculative  stockbuilding  all belong  in the kit of economic  sta- 
bilization  instruments. 
These  realities  of the mixed  auction-customer  world  have  been  flagrantly 
ignored  in U.S. agricultural  policies  of the seventies.  Indeed,  it is hard  to 
find mistakes  in monetary  or fiscal policies that can match the macro- 
economic  damage  wreaked  by the policies  of export  promotion  (backed  by 
no public  stocks)  of farm  products.  Certain  policies  on the pricing  of oil 
50. The macroeconomic  externalities  can be illustrated  by the following arithmetic 
example. Suppose (1) the price elasticity  of U.S. demand for some auction item (say, 
wheat) is 0.2; (2) in light of the social attitude toward the inflation-unemployment 
tradeoff, stabilization  policy aims at a given nominal GNP  target. Then the production 
and domestic  sale of one extra bushel, priced  at $4, lowers nominal farm  GNP by $16 
and permits  a $16 increase in nominal nonfarm GNP. So the bushel is really worth 
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that  essentially  ignored  their  macroeconomic  inflationary  and  recessionary 
effects  rate  another  high place on the horror  list. 
The  especially  heavy  weight  of auction  items  in U.S. exports  and  imports 
has  important  implications  for  exchange-rate  policies  and  for  the  monetary- 
fiscal  mix. The discouragement  to imports  from a depreciating  currency 
may  sacrifice  potential  anti-inflationary  benefits.  Thus,  the undervaluation 
of the dollar  on trade  account  in 1974  and 1975  may be significantly  im- 
pairing  U.S. price  performance  (given  the level of economic  activity). 
The anti-inflationary  benefits  of a highly valued currency  are also an 
argument-although not necessarily  a decisive one-for  less monetary 
stimulus  (offset  by more  fiscal  stimulus).  With  flexible  exchange  rates,  high 
interest  rates  that encourage  short-term  capital  inflows  may  strengthen  the 
currency  and help particularly  to moderate  inflation.  Such a shift in the 
monetary-fiscal  mix would  also help  if domestic  inventory  holdings  of auc- 
tion  commodities  are  especially  sensitive  to interest  rates.  In general,  policy- 
makers  in the mixed  customer-auction  world  should  be critically  aware  of 
the possibilities  for  shifting  the inflation-output  tradeoff  with  measures  that 
have their impact  primarily  on either auction-priced  or customer-priced 
items. Many of those options lie in international  economic  policies, and 
some would  require  negotiation  and coordination  among  trading  partners 
to avoid "inflate-thy-neighbor"  strategies. 
As has  been  widely  suggested,  the worldwide  character  of the 1973  boom 
and the 1971-73 devaluations  of the dollar  contributed  to the particular 
severity  of recent  inflation  in raw  materials  and  other  traded  commodities.5' 
The story of 1966  may have been  just the reverse:  excess demand  in the 
United  States  was  not shared  by its trading  partners,  and  the dollar  was  in- 
creasingly  overvalued;  as a result,  imports  poured  in, dampening  down  the 
inflation  rate  on commodities.  Indeed,  commodity  inflation  was unusually 
moderate  in 1966-69;  as shown  by figure  1, it did not even match  that of 
the middle  and late fifties.  That stability  in the auction  sector  may have 
contributed  to the initial  complacency  of U.S. policy.  That  experience  also 
contributed  in 1972-73  to the serious  errors  of economic  forecasters  (in- 
cluding  me). We were  blindsided  by commodity  inflation  while  we focused 
happily  on tranquil  labor  markets,  as though  they were  the only potential 
source  of serious  inflation. 
51. See, for example,  William  Nordhaus  and John Shoven,  "Inflation  1973:  The Year 
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FISCAL POLICY 
The  makers  of stabilization  policy  face  a particular  problem  because  cus- 
tomer  prices  and career  wages  are  lagging  indicators.  By the time they ex- 
hibit a visible  acceleration  in a cyclical  expansion,  inflation  will have be- 
come  deeply  entrenched.  Discretionary  policy  decisions  require  the guide  of 
more  sensitive  indicators  that will register  excess  demand  more  promptly; 
quit rates, order  backlogs,  and the like should  be examined  carefully  for 
their  potential  contribution  to an early  diagnosis. 
The reverse  problem  created  by customer  and  career  markets  is the need 
for so much unemployment  for so long in order  to work off an inflation 
that has become well entrenched.  Under those circumstances,  there are 
overwhelming  merits  in fiscal  devices  that would operate  directly  to hold 
down prices  with less compression  of output  and employment.  The ideal 
medicine  for an economy  in which  both unemployment  and inflation  are 
too high  is a value-added  subsidy.  And the next  best  is reduction  in broad- 
based  excise  and  sales  taxes  and  payroll  taxes.  While  they  would  be harmful 
in excess-demand  inflation,  these are the only prescriptions  that deal di- 
rectly  and  efficiently  with  the disease  of stagflation.  The  one objection  I hear 
again and again in response  to my advocacy  of such measures  concerns 
their  novelty-a  disadvantage  that would  be remedied  by their  adoption. 
INCOMES POLICY 
Finally,  a case  for price-wage  intervention  by the government  emerges  in 
the customer-auction  world.  If most wages  are  heavily  influenced  by some 
criterion  of fairness  (and do not register  some precise  optimizing  inter- 
section  of supply  and  demand),  the government  can  be constructive  by pro- 
moting  a noninflationary  criterion  (or "guidepost").  In a world  where,  for 
good reasons,  people  care  about  the stability  of the price  level, every  price 
or wage that has a zone of indeterminacy  imposes an external  macro- 
economic  cost when  it is set at the top of the  zone  and  yields  a social  benefit 
when  it is set at the bottom.  To be sure,  there  are grave  difficulties  in pub- 
licly influencing  these  private  decisions;  and  misconceived  controls  can do 
even more  harm  to customer  and career  relationships  than inflation  does. 
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ternalities  may be large enough to compensate  parties  that accept  some 
restraints.62 
The world  of mixed  customer  and auction  markets  poses serious  dilem- 
mas  for  public  policy.  It is not the world  of costless,  fully  adjusted  inflation 
or of intractable  natural unemployment  rates. Its tradeoff  problem is 
genuine  and genuinely  agonizing.  The system  needs  reasonable  price sta- 
bility to preserve  its institutional  framework:  it cannot thrive  with a 14 
percent  or even a 7 percent  rate  of inflation.  And some  loss of output  and 
employment  is worthwhile  and unavoidable  in the cure of an entrenched 
inflation.  But  because  so many  prices  and  wages  respond  so little  to demand 
in the  short  run,  holding  down  output  and  employment  is an extremely  slow 
and  excruciatingly  painful  cure  for  inflation.  The  prolonged  maintenance  of 
unemployment  rates  of 7 percent  or more,  and of shortfalls  in annual  out- 
put of $100 billion to $200 billion, is neither  a sensible  nor a credible 
strategy.  Fortunately,  the system  offers  many opportunities  for more  effi- 
cient policies  to dislodge  an entrenched  inflation.  These  include  measures 
that counter  the destabilizing  influence  of auction  commodities;  that use 
taxes and subsidies  to reduce  costs without  reducing  aggregate  demand; 
and  that influence  wage  and  price  decisions  to reflect  their  macroeconomic 
externalities. 
52. See my 1974  proposal  for real  wage  insurance  in Arthur  Okun,  "Incomes  Inflation 
and the Policy Alternatives,"  in "The Economists'  Conference  on Inflation:  Report," 
vol. 1 (1974; processed),  pp. 369-71. Comments 
and  Discussion 
William  Fellner:  Arthur  Okun's  present  contribution  may be viewed  as a 
companion  piece  of Hicks'  work  on similar  problems,  though  with  a num- 
ber  of distinctive  features.  My first  comment  will  relate  to the paper's  main 
analytical  thesis;  my second  and third  comments  will be concerned  with 
alternative  policy  approaches  to the inflation  problem,  in view of Okun's 
observations  on these. 
First,  Okun's  seller  in a customer  market  is uncertain  about  the long-run 
price elasticity  of the demand  that he individually  faces, and he is risk 
averse.  The reasons  Okun  gives  for the uncertainty  about  elasticity-even 
about its sign-are  presented  in a particularly  constructive  and original 
section  of the paper  in which  the disruptive  effect  of price  changes  on cus- 
tomer  relations  is stressed. 
As for the seller's  risk  aversion,  this is in part  the kind  that is consistent 
with  the  von Neumann-Morgenstern-Savage  axioms,  but  that  risk  aversion 
also includes  another  element.  Even if the risk-averse  seller  acts consis- 
tently  with the usual  probability-utility  axioms,  he will prefer  smaller  ex- 
pected  profits  predicted  with  relatively  little  uncertainty  to larger  expected 
profits  with undesirable  characteristics  of the higher  moments  of a dis- 
tribution. 
But Okun's  strong  emphasis  on custom,  and on past practices  that  have 
come  to be considered  usual  and fair,  strongly  suggests  to me that,  accord- 
ing  to him,  more  is involved  here  than  the risk  aversion  compatible  with  the 
usual  probability-utility  axioms.  One arrives  at the same  conclusion  when 
reading  Hicks. They have their way of describing  the additional  factor 
shaping  this  risk  aversion.  Let  me say  a word  about  my way  of looking  at it. 
Basically,  the question  here  is how to interpret  the concept  of rationality. 
One  must  recognize  that  it is often  too costly,  or even  literally  impossible, 
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to structure  a problem  involving  probabilities  in such a way as to derive 
probability  judgments  for the payoffs  from the probabilities  assigned  to 
clearly  specified  conditions  (and  conditions  of conditions),  and  then  to add 
together  the weighted  conditional  probabilities  so defined.  Many  decision 
problems  remain  ill-structured  in the sense that one has little confidence 
that all conditions  to which  probabilities  should  have been assigned  have 
indeed  been accounted  for, and this state of affairs  does not lend itself to 
even rough  subjective  estimates  of the variance  that is thereby  introduced 
into the final probability  judgment.  Also, the final probability  judgment 
relating  to the payoffs  is apt to be more controversial  among competent 
individuals  the less well-structured  a decision  problem  is in this sense. 
In some of these  situations  it is very  tempting  to rely  on a rule  of thumb 
biased  toward  the status  quo,  in some  sense  of this  term,  and  I see  no reason 
for postulating  that such behavior  is generally  "unintelligent"  or tends 
toward worse long-run  results than reliance on controversial  personal 
probabilities-on hunches.  This poses a problem  of considerable  interest 
for  decision  theory,  and  also for the  theory  of resource  allocation  and  other 
branches  of economic  theory.  To my way  of thinking,  Okun  is calling  atten- 
tion to a specific  aspect  of this  general  problem.  A quantitative  appraisal  of 
the problem's  significance  for pricing  practices  will require  more  empirical 
research;  the models  sketched  in Okun's  paper  are intended  to be merely 
illustrative,  and they perform  this function  effectively.  Inflation  makes  it 
impossible  to follow  various  customary  practices  that have been  preferred 
on both  sides  of a good  many  markets,  though  the evaluation  of these  prac- 
tices  from  a general  economic  point of view raises  as yet unresolved  ques- 
tions. 
Second,  turning  to the inflation  problem  more  generally,  I will note that 
both Okun  and Hicks  are  removing  from  the Keynesian  system  the  justifi- 
cation  for inflation  that is incorporated  in Keynes'  concept  of involuntary 
unemployment  (adapted  to the growth  context  by Tobin).  There  the  justifi- 
cation  is provided  by postulating  that  rising  prices  bring  real  wage  rates  to 
their equilibrium  level. Okun's  analysis  suggests  to me that he is rightly 
skeptical  about this hypothesis-certainly about building policy on it. 
Hicks,  too, expressed  his doubts  about  the real-wage  equilibrating  effect  of 
inflation. 
I don't  see  any  other  convincing  case  for  net benefits  from  a rising  general 
price  level.  The  remaining  arguments  seem  to me clearly  too weak  to offset 
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flation.  One  must  therefore  conclude  that from  about  1965  on inflation  has 
resulted  either from the mistaken  unwillingness  of demand-management 
policymakers  to observe  constraints  set by price-level  objectives,  or by the 
inability of a policy  aiming  for price  stability  to achieve  it and to avoid  the 
unintended  result  of underutilization  of capacity  combined  with inflation. 
The  data  for 1951-65  disclose  neither  a mistaken  unwillingness  to be guided 
by price-stability  constraints  nor lack of success  in this effort.  The more 
recent  record  is different. 
Given the 1965-74  record,  the problem,  as I see it, is to condition  the 
markets  anew  to price-level  objectives  of policymakers,  as the only way to 
avoid disturbances  from large unexpected  movements  of prices. In my 
appraisal,  a gradual  return  to price  stability  is the appropriate  target,  and 
Okun's  analysis  strengthens  this belief. Even the dissenters  should agree 
that  demand  policies  can  be successful  only  if they  have  some  credible  target 
for prices.  The  reason  is that  price  expectations  must  become  grounded  at a 
point lying outside  the area of the expectational  system  itself. 
Third,  a demand-management  policy  to which  price  expectations  become 
conditioned  can be employment  oriented  only within  the limits  compatible 
with a price  constraint.  Such  a policy cannot  promise  the achievement  of 
specified  unemployment-rate  targets.  The policy  would  have to be supple- 
mented  by workable  arrangements  involving  de facto subsistence  guaran- 
tees,  and,  to be successful,  arrangements  of this sort need  to satisfy  a num- 
ber of specific  conditions.  But this is the best chance  we have, because  the 
attempt  to hit low unemployment  rates  by means  of inflation  is doomed  to 
failure  and direct  price  and wage  controls  would  not solve our difficulties. 
By now the truly  controversial  question  relates  less to the dangers  of infla- 
tion than  to attitudes  about  controls.  This,  too, is reflected  in Okun's  paper. 
Okun  is certainly  no believer  in comprehensive  control  programs,  but I 
have  strong  misgivings  also about  benign  methods  of administering  limited 
wage  and  price  controls,  including  the acceptance  of governmental  respon- 
sibility  for specific  wage-price  decisions  in the form of guidepost  policy, 
jawboning,  and the like. Okun  does not share  these  misgivings.  In my ap- 
praisal,  direct  controls  can achieve  certain  objectives  only by reliance  on 
the police  power-and then only at the expense  of other  important  objec- 
tives. Trying  to be "nice"  about the administration  of such a program 
makes  the regulations  largely  ineffective  and their  incidence  entirely  hap- 
hazard.  The main  result  of this ineffectiveness  and of the hit-or-miss  exer- 
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by the  policy  conclusions  Okun  derives  from  his analysis,  what  he and  I see 
differently  is the magnitude  of this risk,  which  to me seems  very great. 
Michael  Wachter:  Okun's  paper is very much in the spirit of his earlier 
paper,  "Upward  Mobility  in a High-Pressure  Economy"  (BPEA, 1:1973), 
and represents  an important  extension  of the ideas explored  there.  Here 
Okun  addresses  two issues-the mechanics  and the welfare  costs of infla- 
tion-and  applies  his model to see its implications  for these problems.  I 
think  that  the paper  makes  considerable  progress  on both issues,  and pro- 
vides  a very  useful  framework  for understanding  the institutional  economic 
environment  in which  inflation  takes  place.  In particular,  it is a neoclassical 
model  that  does  not rely  on the  job-search  imagery.  My disagreements  with 
the  paper  are  generally  confined  to a few of the inferences  that  Okun  draws 
from  his model. In these  cases  Okun  strays  from  what  I believe  to be the 
(deceptively)  strong  neoclassical  conclusions  inherent  in his model. 
The model is based on two sectors:  a customer-market  sector and an 
auction-market  sector. A particularly  strong  point is Okun's  systematic 
description  of the nature  of these  polar market  types and their  likely im- 
pact  on inflation.  First,  the existence  of customer  markets  creates  long lags 
between  inflation  and its determinants.  Although  Okun  uses the terminol- 
ogy "costs  of information"  to refer  to the basis of the lagged  response,  he 
differentiates  his approach  from  the  job-search  school.  I would  argue,  how- 
ever,  that this terminology  can be seriously  misleading.  In the  job-search 
school, "costs  of information"  refers  to the costs workers  and employers 
(buyers  and sellers)  incur  largely  in learning  about  the current  distribution 
of prices,  wages,  employment  opportunities,  and so on. Long  lags  are  most 
unlikely  to arise in this situation;  indeed,  these informational  problems 
may characterize  the rapidly  responding  auction markets  of the Okun 
model.  The lags in the customer  markets  arise  in an institutional  setting. 
Buyers  and sellers  do have informational  problems  in understanding  their 
current  environment,  but  the  real  issue  is that  they  are  maximizing  long-run 
profits  (or wages  and so on) in a world  of ongoing  relationships  among  the 
economic  actors. Factors such as customer  loyalty, specific  training  of 
workers  and  their  upgrading  along  promotion  ladders,  and the prevalence 
of contractual  obligations  (explicit  and  implicit)  suggest  that  the real  prob- 
lem  is that  the future-rather  than the present-is unknown.  The absence 
of futures  markets  that would enable  economic  agents  to hedge against 
most  changes  in prices  and  wages  and  in performance  levels  of workers  and 
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futures  markets;  empirically,  it cannot-the  possible future  states of the 
world are too numerous  and complicated.  In this sense, it is the institu- 
tional  arrangements  of the customer  markets  and not costs of information 
that  account  for  the  sluggish  response  of inflation  (as well  as any  number  of 
other variables).  My disagreement  with Okun here is not merely  termi- 
nological,  but it is only a matter  of degree:  I would  place  more weight  on 
the inability  to forecast  or to hedge against future developments  in an 
economy  in which  ongoing  relationships  are prevalent. 
Okun's  second  major  point is that inflation  has large  welfare  costs be- 
cause it impinges  on the workings  of these long-run  relationships  in the 
customer  markets.  In this argument,  I believe  that he is directly  on target. 
I wonder  whether  this  new  paper  implies  a shift  in Okun's  own  utility-func- 
tion tradeoff  between  inflation  and unemployment.  In the world of cus- 
tomer markets  there is no such thing as a pure inflation.  Institutional 
arrangements  can be altered  to meet  new problems,  but the transition  can 
be exceedingly  long and difficult.  Furthermore,  no evidence  suggests  that 
there  are "inflation-neutral"  methods  of institutional  change.  And even if 
they exist, it is impossible  to predict  that they will be adopted,  given the 
lack of a theory of institutional  change.  Of course,  the quantitative  im- 
portance  of this problem  is not easily  measured,  so that its impact  on the 
neutrality-of-inflation  story  cannot  be assessed. 
An important  and valuable  aspect of Okun's  work has been to divert 
concern  with the problem  of institutional  lags away  from oligopolies  and 
unions and toward  broader  concepts  such as customer  markets.  In this 
manner  the model focuses  on the desire  of firms  to deal with promotion 
ladders,  quits, and turnover  costs, rather  than union contracts.  This con- 
struct  suffers  from  the uncertain  definition  of its boundaries,  and  there  is a 
related  unresolved  problem  of endogeneity.  Whereas  the union  and oligop- 
oly sectors  are  identifiable  and  there  are  even  some  theories  about  why  they 
arise,  the same  cannot  be said  (at least  to the  same  extent)  for  the customer- 
market  sectors.  For example,  what  industries  develop  into customer  mar- 
kets and why?  And what characteristics  are customer  markets  likely to 
have-which party  bears  the risks  of rigid  price  arrangements,  the costs of 
training  workers,  and the like? This is an important  gap in the analysis, 
although  one  certainly  cannot  fault  Okun  for  not solving  it all in one  paper. 
In Okun's  model,  customer  markets  are  not spread  randomly  across  the 
economy.  Rather,  the complicated  arrangements  of these  markets  develop 
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the auction  market.'  Clearly,  microeconomics  and profit-maximizing  be- 
havior  are relevant  in this world.  I am reluctant  to argue  that all institu- 
tional arrangements,  along the customer-auction  continuum,  are in equi- 
librium  in the third  quarter  of 1975; but the role of efficiency  makes  me 
cautious  about suggesting  changes  in these arrangements  until I know 
where  the inefficiencies  are located.  It is on this point, for example,  that I 
would criticize  Okun's  suggestions  on the usefulness  of wage and price 
controls.  He argues  that  wages  are  heavily  influenced,  and  prices  somewhat 
influenced,  by some criterion  of  "fairness"  in customer  markets.  Un- 
doubtedly,  he is correct,  but one must exercise  care in interpreting  what 
fairness  means. 
"Fair"  wage  (and  price)  differentials  do not imply  differentials  that  arise 
largely  by chance,  play a small  allocative  role, or respond  easily  to govern- 
ment  manipulation.  This  problem  is made  all the  more  difficult  by the cycli- 
cal variations  of these  differentials  as a consequence  of the different  lengths 
of the planning  period  of the relevant  firms.  As a result,  the government 
cannot observe  and then enforce  equilibrium  differentials.  Beyond  this is 
the  enforcement  problem  posed  by the sheer  number  of wages  and  prices  to 
be supervised.  Hence, I interpret  the Okun customer-auction  model as 
making an incomes policy less rather  than more attractive.  Wages can 
always  be controlled  by the government,  but the social  and economic  costs 
may be high in the customer  markets. 
In any case, to the extent  that controls  are adopted,  they need not be 
economy-wide.  As I have argued  elsewhere,  an analysis  of wage differen- 
tials makes  it clear  that cost-push  inflation,  to the extent  that it currently 
exists,  is heavily  concentrated  in  the  construction  and  governmental  sectors.2 
The  wage  differentials  in these  two sectors  have  shown  a secular  rise  that  far 
outmatches  changes  in other  sectors  over  recent  years.  The wage  problems 
in these sectors,  however,  do not arise specifically  because  they are cus- 
tomer  markets.  Rather,  inappropriate  government  policy seems  to be the 
source  of the inflationary  bias. Consequently,  overall  economy-wide  con- 
trols  are  not needed;  instead,  structural  changes  in these  two markets  could 
go far in reducing  cost-push  factors.  Concentrating  control  efforts  in the 
offending  sectors  also  has  the  merit  of easing  the  enforcement  problem.  Un- 
fortunately,  such a simple  solution  seems  to be politically  unattractive. 
1. The efficiency  role of internal  labor markets  is a primary  argument  in my paper, 
"Primary  and Secondary  Labor Markets:  A Critique  of the Dual Approach,"  BPEA, 
3:1974,  pp. 637-80. 
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I would  also argue  with Okun's  conjecture  that customer  markets  have 
an inflationary  bias. It may very well be that there  are significant  institu- 
tional  rigidities  to falling  wage  levels  (but much  less so to prices),  so that 
customer  markets  may  be prone  to wage  inflation  at very  low rates  of infla- 
tion. On the other  hand,  I see no reason  why  customer  markets  should  im- 
part a significant  upward  drift to inflation  rates  that are not close to the 
zero level. In particular,  the U.S. economy  has had little experience  with 
wage  drift  (or overfulfillment  of contracts),  and  increasing  union-wage  pre- 
miums  have  been  limited  largely  to the construction  and  municipal  sectors. 
I believe  that the inflation  problem  of customer  markets  is more closely 
related  to the timing  of discrete  wage  and price  changes  than to a secular 
upward  bias.  My guess  is that  the current  price  increases  in steel  and  alumi- 
num are examples  of just this point. 
I found  the section  on assets  and interest  rates  too brief  for such a diffi- 
cult question.  This  topic alone  could  be the subject  of a separate  paper.  In 
any case, I do not follow Okun's  quick  jump to the conclusion  that the 
mixed world of customer  and auction  markets  discriminates  against  the 
"typical"  household-that is, favors the "sharpies"  over the "suckers." 
Empirically,  the literature  on the redistributional  effects  of inflation  argues 
strongly  against a systematic  bias in favor of the wealthy.  Okun's dis- 
cussion of the reaction  of businessmen  to inflation  is more in the spirit 
of his argument.  Institutional  rigidities  make  it difficult  for firms  to adjust 
to a change  in the rate of inflation  even when  the new rate  is equal  to the 
rate  they estimated.  Hence,  in a mixed  world  of rapidly  and slowly  adjust- 
ing markets,  inflation  generates  considerable  real  effects.  These  effects  can- 
not be anticipated,  however,  in large  part  because  they  depend  upon  under- 
lying secular  changes  in relative  prices  (or product  demands)  that may be 
taking  place  as well  as because  not all customer  markets  adjust  slowly  all of 
the time. When  contracts  come due or when  new commitments  are made, 
the relevant  customer  markets  adjust  rapidly.  The result-and this is a 
central  point-is  that the real effects  of inflation  generate  a great  deal of 
uncertainty. 
A few small  points: First, Okun  doubts  that increasing  transfers  to the 
unemployed  contribute  to an increase  in the noninflationary  unemploy- 
ment  rate,  but  he subsequently  argues  that  layoffs  from  the customer  sector 
are not as painful  because  of transfer  income.  Although  this is not neces- 
sarily  a contradiction,  I would  argue  that the (relative)  increase  in transfer 
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Second,  Okun  argues  that wages  essentially  follow  some  combination  of 
prices  and other  wages,  but are  largely  independent  of aggregate  demand. 
Indeed,  even the reduced-form  relationship  between  prices  and past and 
current  wages is unstable  over time and across countries.  Although  the 
underlying  mechanism  is quite  different,  by adopting  this approach  Okun 
is utilizing  the Keynes-Weintraub  type  of model,  in which  wages  are  exoge- 
nous.  This  strong  exogeneity  argument  is, in a sense,  a natural-rate  theory 
of the rate of wage inflation.  It is even more pessimistic  than the Lucas- 
Sargent  models  in that they hold out the hope that at least the reduced- 
form,  autoregressive  structure  will be useful  for prediction  purposes.  In a 
paper  on the responsiveness  of wages  to inflation  for the next Brookings 
panel,  I come  to a different  conclusion  about  the exogeneity  of wage  infla- 
tion. The type of model that involves  a fixed planning  period,  based on 
institutional  rigidities,  modifies  the rational-expectations  results.  Essen- 
tially, the institutional  rigidities  allow the system  to appear  to be "irra- 
tional"  for at least the length  of the planning  period.  Hence,  the Sargent 
statistical  exogeneity  conditions  may hold, but they are relevant  only over 
the  longer  time  horizon.  For quarterly  or even  yearly  models,  the empirical 
relationships  may  still  be more  systematic  than  a moving-average,  autocor- 
related  structure.  Consequently,  even if one adopts  a rational-expectations 
framework,  plenty of room remains  for aggregate  unemployment-espe- 
cially  if it can be properly  measured-to influence  wage  inflation. 
To summarize,  the Okun  paper  is an important  statement  of the inflation 
mechanism  and its resulting  welfare  costs. The major  factor  is that  institu- 
tional arrangements  that are currently  based on zero, or close to zero, 
inflation  have been strained  and are being forced  to change.  In today's 
economy, even if inflation  is correctly  anticipated,  there remain institutional 
and contractual  rigidities  that prevent  economic  actors from  adjusting  to 
inflation  and consequently  that  imply  that  continuing  inflation  will impose 
real  effects  on the economy. 
General  Discussion 
William  Nordhaus  began  the  critique  of "customer  markets"  by agreeing 
with  the  author  that  many  firms  and  industries  adjust  to changes  in demand 
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retical  explanation;  and while  Nordhaus  felt that he had not seen a con- 
vincing  one elsewhere,  he did not find  Okun's  persuasive  either.  Basically, 
the  amendment  of the paper  to the  Phelps-Winter  model  makes  the  propor- 
tion of customers  who go shopping  change  discretely  in response  to even  an 
infinitesimal  price  increase  by the supplier.  To Nordhaus,  that was not an 
adequate  rationale  for the stickiness  of prices  in response  to shifts of de- 
mand.  The  main  difficulty  was  that  he was  not persuaded  that  the informa- 
tion  tickets  had  sufficient  value  to consumers  to make  them  a quantitatively 
significant  phenomenon.  Richard  Cooper  pursued  the issue  of the value  of 
information  tickets.  On the one hand,  he was  impressed  by the information 
costs involved  in obtaining  services  from new suppliers  when one moved 
cross-country,  for  example.  That  indicated  that  the  bilateral  rents  shared  by 
cooperating  suppliers  and  customers  could  be quantitatively  important.  On 
the other  hand,  if those search  costs are high and the quasi-rents  substan- 
tial, Cooper thought  that one should expect well-organized  markets  for 
consumer  information  that would  attempt,  in effect,  to supply  Okun's  in- 
formation  tickets  at a lower  cost. 
William  Poole felt that  the customer-supplier  relationship  had to rest  on 
the confidence  of the buyer  in obtaining  the lowest  relative  price  of a prod- 
uct rather  than  the most stable  absolute  price.  If the buyer  has confidence 
that some discount  house consistently  charges  favorable  prices, he will 
accept  rises  in their  price  tags, still feeling  that the prices  are  lower  than  at 
competing  retailers. 
Robert Hall argued  that the cyclical  constancy  of markups  could be 
reconciled  with  the classical  theory  of price  determination  as long as supply 
is highly  elastic,  average  costs are thus flat, and capital  is a mobile  factor 
that  earns  a rental  price.  In response  to a question  from  Okun,  Hall agreed 
that the output  of any particular  firm  would  be indeterminate  under  those 
circumstances.  On a related  point, Robert  J. Gordon  remarked  that the 
absence  of market-clearing  arrangements  did not necessarily  stem from 
information  costs or customer  relationships,  but rather  might  reflect  low 
short-run  price  elasticities  of demand.  In effect,  the  hotel  owner  may  not act 
as an auctioneer  simply  because  he doubts  that he could  fill the rooms  on 
some  days  even  at a very  low price.  The  classical  theory  of derived  demand 
could explain  such short-run  inelasticity  for many kinds of products  and 
services,  without invoking  Okun's  particular  rationale. 
The strength  and potentialities  of the customer-product  model were 
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approach  would  stimulate  other  researchers  to do additional  fruitful  work. 
He suggested  that  economists  might  learn  more  about  these  issues  from  an 
extensive  body  of literature  in the marketing  field  that  discussed  techniques 
of developing  customer  relationships  and establishing  brand  loyalty.  Holt 
saw important  alternatives  for public  policy  in attempting  to improve  the 
structure  of markets  or to intervene  in the existing  structure  so as to make 
it function  better.  He urged  thorough  exploration  of the possibilities  of 
using  taxes  and subsidies  to discourage  excessive  wage  and price  increases, 
to encourage  the expansion  of production,  and otherwise  to elicit micro- 
economic  behavior  with favorable  macroeconomic  effects.  R. A. Gordon 
approved  of the introduction  of the concept  of fair  play and similar  long- 
run  interpersonal  considerations  into the analysis  of pricing,  as recognition 
of an important  kind  of rationality  that  was generally  ignored  in neoclassi- 
cal general-equilibrium  theory.  He also expressed  his support  for the kinds 
of novel policy approaches  that Okun had espoused.  In Walter  Salant's 
judgment,  the paper  provided  the best explanation  to date of some im- 
portant  facts about price-quantity  interactions  that have been empirically 
well established  but have often been analytically  ignored  or rejected  be- 
cause  no theoretical  framework  was offered  to explain  them. 
In contrast  to his reservations  about  the customer-product  market,  R. J. 
Gordon  felt that the analysis  of career  labor markets  was on the "right 
track."  He suggested  a number  of other  avenues  that might  be explored, 
like  the inherent  logic of seniority  rules  and  the way  they  tend  to encourage 
layoffs  in preference  to wage  reductions  in a recession.  Gordon  was  encour- 
aged by a growing  body of literature  developing  the concept of implicit 
contracts  in labor  markets.  Hall, on the other  hand, doubted  that  specific 
human  capital  was of sufficient  importance  to explain  very much about 
wage  rigidity.  He agreed  that  the  existence  of specific  human  capital  created 
a zone of indeterminacy  in wages;  hence,  wage  rates  might  not respond  to 
changes  in labor-market  tightness,  as long as they remained  within the 
altered  zone. However,  he parted  company  with  Okun  on the  empirical  sig- 
nificance  of specific  capital  and hence on the size of the zone of indeter- 
minacy.  Hall pointed  to the extremely  high interfirm  mobility  of certain 
types of craft workers  like lithographers;  they must have essentially  no 
firm-specific  capital.  He also suggested  that, if problems  of internal  wage 
structure  deterred  existing  firms  from taking advantage  of a very weak 
labor  market  by reducing  wages,  one would expect  the accelerated  estab- 
lishment  of new firms. 
A number  of participants  took issue with Okun's  rejection  of steady Arthur  M. Okun  401 
inflation  as a target  for public  policy. Robert  Solow contended  that, even 
in a world  of customer  markets,  the major  costs of inflation  lay in the  irreg- 
ularity  and  unevenness  of the rate  of price  increase.  He saw no compelling 
reason  why  the  relative  irregularity  around  a positive  inflation  trend  should 
be greater  than that around  a horizontal  trend. Moreover,  the customer 
need  only  believe  that his preferred  seller  quotes  prices  in the right  general 
range,  not that they be constant.  In short, while smooth inflation  is ad- 
mittedly  impossible,  so is smooth  price  stability.  R. J. Gordon  noted  that  a 
cost-benefit  calculation  was necessary  to establish  whether,  once the infla- 
tion  rate  reached  6 percent,  it was  better  to try  to beat  the  rate  back  down  to 
zero or to try  to maintain  the prevailing  rate  as smoothly  as possible  there- 
after.  William  Feltner  supported  the verdict  of the paper;  in his view, to 
accept  an inflation  trend  just because  it had in fact developed  entailed  a 
posture  for public  policy  that  lacked  credibility.  James  Pierce,  on the other 
hand,  argued  that a target  of zero or near-zero  inflation  had a tremendous 
dispersion  in one direction  and  therefore  might  create  more  uncertainty  for 
the public  than  a target  from  which  deviations  were  likely  to be more  sym- 
metrical.  Pierce interpreted  recent developments  in financial  markets- 
such  as floating-rate  notes  and  money-market  funds-as evidence  of greater 
adaptability  to inflation  than Okun  had suggested. 
Michael  Lovell  commented  that the "refixing  of arrangements"  that in- 
flation  necessitated,  according  to Hicks  and  Okun,  was  not necessarily  bad. 
By shaking  up conventions  that  contribute  to price  rigidity,  inflation  might 
contribute  to economic  efficiency  by facilitating  the realignment  of relative 
prices. 
Okun  responded  to a number  of the  comments.  In response  to Nordhaus, 
he defended  the discontinuity  in the shopping  function,  arguing  that some 
change  in price  is qualitatively  different  from  no change  in price,  particu- 
larly  insofar  as it could affect  the confidence  of the customer  that today's 
price  would be maintained  tomorrow.  Agreeing  with Fellner  on the need 
for credible  price-level  objectives,  he contended  that price expectations 
must  depend  on the government's  policies  toward  grain  exports  and  energy 
as well as on monetary  and fiscal  policy. He reiterated  that conventional 
wage  and  price  controls  stood low in his ranking  of potential  solutions;  he 
shared  Holt's sympathy  for techniques  that might  use the price  system  to 
deal with macroeconomic  externalities.  More generally,  Okun urged  the 
need for professional  brainstorming  to develop socially and politically 
acceptable  mechanisms  that  could  help  to dislodge  inflation  while  reducing 
the required  sacrifices  of output  and employment. 